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The commercial practice of direct marketing has evolved tremendously with the advent of 
technology and therefore has both advantages and disadvantages associated with it. It has the 
advantage of assisting marketers in the running of their businesses by gaining valuable 
customer support, as well as providing a source of income for those employed by such 
marketing companies. It also contributes considerably to the economy by fuelling the chain of 
supply and demand. 
Direct marketing has an adverse effect when it is unsolicited and thereby intrudes on the 
privacy of consumers. It is therefore imperative that a balance be struck between the need for 
direct marketing as a commercial tool and the exploitation of the privacy rights of consumers. 
At present, the practice of direct marketing is primarily regulated by statute in the form of the 
Consumer Protection Act, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act and the 
newly promulgated Protection of Personal Information Act. As will be discussed, there are 
various inconsistencies in the legislation which allow for truant direct marketers to 
circumvent the law. 
In light of the above, the aim of this dissertation will be to consider the current regulatory 
framework concerning direct marketing, and will go on to examine the impact that the 
Protection of Personal Information Act will have on the practice. The analysis will further 
draw a comparison of the regulation of direct marketing in two foreign jurisdictions, and will 







Chapter 1:  Introduction and overview 
 
1.1.Introduction 
The right to privacy in South Africa (SA) is jealously protected by the judicial system
1
and is 
considered to be a salient entitlement which all individuals should be afforded. As a result, 
the right to privacy is provided for in both the common law
2
 and statutory law
3
 and the 
Constitution
4
 specifically entrenches the right to privacy in the Bill of Rights.
5
 
The crucial issue this dissertation will explore relates to the exploitation of personal 
information through the practice of direct marketing and the subsequent violation of the right 
to privacy.
6
 In response to this, SA has produced various pieces of legislation which deal with 
the treatment of personal information in respect of direct marketing. These include
7
 the 
Consumer Protection Act (CPA),
8
 the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
(ECTA) 
9




1.2.Outline of research problem 
The world in recent years has seen a significant advancement in technology and this 
technological boom has bolstered the processing of personal information, which in turn 
means that data such as contact numbers may be extracted and exploited with 
ease.
11
Furthermore, in light of ever-expanding social media platforms, individuals have made 
it effortless for their personal details to be freely accessible to anyone who wishes to acquire 
                                                             
1
Minister of Police and Others v Kunjana 2016 (2) SACR 473 (CC) 32. 
2
See the detailed discussion of the common law protection of the right to privacy in paragraph 2.2. 
3
See the detailed discussion of the statutory protection of the right to privacy in chapter 4 in terms of the CPA, 
ECTA and POPI. 
4
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (hereafter referred to as “the Constitution”). 
5
s14 of the Constitution. 
6
See discussion in chapter 4. 
7
There are other pieces of legislation which deal with the treatment of personal information such as s74 of the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005. Due to the limited scope of this dissertation, only the focal legislation will be 
considered. 
8
Act 68 of 2008. 
9
Act 25 of 2002. 
10
Act 4 of 2013. 
11
C Mathhes ‘Unpacking the POPI Act: The ins and outs of protecting personal information’ (2014) available at 






The practice of direct marketing becomes problematic when marketers misuse the 
personal information of consumers and thereby infringe on their right to privacy. 
In analysing this problem and seeking to propose solutions , it is essential to examine the 
current legislative framework together with the common law and existing precedent. 
Furthermore, it will be interesting to see how the enforcement of POPI (and the regulations 
thereto) by the Information Regulator,
13
 attempts to improve the situation and promote the 
right to data privacy. 
1.3.Statement of purpose  
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the current regulatory framework in respect of 
direct marketing and to determine how POPI will impact on such a framework when it is 
fully operational.
14
 A comparison will also be drawn with foreign law so as to examine 
whether SA can learn from its international counterparts. Moreover, a cost-benefit analysis 
will be drawn between the importance of data protection legislation and the need for access to 
personal information for business reasons - the purpose of which is to balance both needs and 
ascertain a middle ground that is mutually beneficial to all stakeholders involved. 
Finally, the ultimate purpose of this dissertation after having examined the regulatory 
framework, is to provide solutions or recommendations for a way forward in respect of the 
difficulties faced by consumers as a result of the abuse of the practice of direct marketing.  
1.4.Rationale for this research 
SA is moving toward becoming a consumer-centric society which complies with related 
international standards.
15
In this light, it is essential to examine how POPI will affect 
consumers, businesses and the economy, and in particular, the practice of direct marketing. 
Since POPI is a newly promulgated piece of legislation, there is a dearth of scholarly writing 
                                                             
12
PS Abril ‘Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World’ (2007) Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 5. 
13
The Information Regulator is established by chapter 5 of POPI and is responsible for enforcing compliance 
with the Act amongst other things. 
14
Although POPI has been enacted, there are only a few provisions that are currently operative. These include 
the definitions section (s1); Part A of Chapter 5 which establishes the Information Regulator; the regulations 
section-(s112) and s113, which sets out the procedure for making regulations. The implementation of the rest of 
its provisions has been suspended until the President announces that they are operational via the government 
gazette. 
15
T Woker ‘Why the need for consumer protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind the 




considering its implications. This dissertation will therefore aim to contr ibute to the dialogue 
on POPI.  
1.5.Research questions 
 
a) How is the right to privacy currently regulated in South Africa? 
b) What is direct marketing? And what are the advantages and disadvantages thereof? 
c) What is the current South African framework regulating direct marketing? 
d) How will POPI impact on direct marketing and the current regulatory framework in  
South Africa? 
e) What are the foreign and international positions with regard to data privacy and direct 
marketing, and how do they contrast with South African law? 
f) Will POPI be effective in achieving its mandate to promote and protect the right to 
data privacy? 
g) What are the functions of the Information Regulator? And how can the Information 
Regulator improve the regulation of direct marketing in South Africa? 
 
1.6.A brief overview of the legal framework addressing direct marketing in South 
Africa 
For the purposes of creating a backdrop against which we can understand the protection of 
data privacy, this dissertation will begin by examining the common law after which the 
statutory and constitutional rights shall be considered. The analysis will conclude by drawing 
a comparison between domestic and international data protection and direct marketing laws. 
In respect of the common law position on the protection of privacy, the actio iniuriarum is a 
delictual common law remedy which protects the right to dignity, amongst other entitlements. 
Dignity in this form includes the right to privacy
16
- therefore privacy does not exist as a 
separate or distinct right under the common law.  
The right to privacy also enjoys constitutional protection and in this regard section 14 of the 
Constitution entrenches the right to privacy, however like its common law counterpart, it is 
not absolute and may be limited in terms of a law of general application.
17
 It thus has to be 
                                                             
16
See for example Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993(4) SA 842(A) 849. 
17




balanced with other rights in a manner that is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society.
18
Examples of such rights in the context of data privacy and direct 
marketing, would be a direct marketer’s right to choose their trade, occupation or profession 
freely,
19
 freedom of expression
20
 and access to information.
21
 
With regard to the statutory protection of the right to privacy in light of direct marketing, 
section 11 of the CPA regulates the consumer’s right to restrict unwanted direct marketing 
and the consumer has the right to refuse to accept direct marketing communications, to 
require the marketer to discontinue its marketing, or to apply to pre-emptively block such 
marketing. It therefore creates an opt-out mechanism
22
 for consumers. Similarly, section 45 
of ECTA also provides consumers with an opt-out mechanism by stipulating that senders 
may send out any electronic communication provided that it is a commercial communication 
and the sender must also give the consumer an option to opt-out of receiving further 
communications.  
The aforementioned opt-out mechanisms are not as effective as they aim to be, as it simply 
means that a consumer may be laboriously inconvenienced by direct marketing until they 
take the initiative to opt-out of the communications. These and other issues will however be 
closely examined in chapter 4. 
As mentioned above, the status quo in respect of the CPA and ECTA reflects an opt-out 
regime. POPI on the other hand, seeks to fundamentally change the status quo to create an 
opt-in mechanism, in that a consumer’s consent would need to be obtained before direct 
marketing communications are sent to them. In this light, section 69 of POPI regulates the 
processing of personal information of a data subject
23
 for the purpose of direct marketing by 
means of any form of electronic communication, including automatic calling machines, 
facsimile machines, sms’s or e-mail. The aforementioned is prohibited unless the data subject 
has given his or her or its consent (opted in) to the processing or is a customer of the marketer 
                                                             
18
s36 of the Constitution. 
19
s22 of the Constitution. 
20
s16 of the Constitution. 
21
s32 of the Constitution. 
22
An “opt-out” mechanism is one which allows the consumer to require the marketer to cease communications. 
23
s1 of POPI defines “data subject” as the person to whom personal information relates. In the context of this 






). More importantly, the responsible party need only obtain consent from 
a data subject once, provided they have not previously withheld consent.   
This shift from an opt-out regime to an opt-in system is indeed a welcomed change as it 
illustrates that the legislature is desirous of awarding consumers more control over their data 
privacy rights by placing the power to consent squarely within their domain. However, as 
with most things, there are both advantages and disadvantages to the opt-in mechanism, 
which will be considered further in paragraph 4.4.5. 
1.7.An international perspective on data privacy 
Internationally, there are various instruments which deal with the right to data privacy. 
Examples of these include the Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (COE Convention)
25
 
and the 1981 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines 




In 1995, the European Union (EU) endorsed the Data Protection Directive 
27
(EU Directive) 
so as to synchronize the legislative framework of its member states. The EU member states 
have adopted a set of legally binding data processing rules known as the “binding corporate 
rules”.
28
 In promulgating POPI, the drafters have taken guidance from the EU in that POPI 
expressly sanctions the binding corporate rules.
29
 
This dissertation will also draw a comparative analysis between the laws of the United 
Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand (NZ), so as to consider any lessons that may be learnt from 
these foreign jurisdictions which may be incorporated into the South African legal 
framework. 
                                                             
24
s1 of POPI defines a “responsible party” as a public or private body or any other person who determines the 
purpose of and the means for processing personal information. In the context of this dissertation, a responsible 
party would be a direct marketer. 
25
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automat ic Processing of 
Personal Data ETS No. 108 Strasbourg, 1981. 
26
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development “Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data” Paris, 1981. 
27
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data. 
28
A Roos ‘Core principles of data protection law’ (2006) CILSA 34. 
29





In order to engage with the issues surrounding direct marketing, this dissertation will consider 
in detail, the common law, constitutional and statutory regulation of the practice. In 
particular, the CPA, ECTA and POPI will be closely examined so as to assess the extent to 
which data privacy is entrenched in these pieces of legislation, and whether they actually 
fulfil their respective mandates or not. Moreover, the analysis will conclude with a view to 






Chapter 2: An analysis of the right to privacy in South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction 
All individuals require a certain level of privacy as a necessary facet of one’s 
personality.
30
The right to privacy can be described as quite simply the right “to be left 
alone”
31
 and a breach of this right is a transgression on the inner sanctum
32
 of a person.
33
The 




As a concept, privacy has traditionally been difficult to define.
35
 The following definition by 
Neethling
36
was accepted in National Media Ltd v Jooste:
37
 
“Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by exclusion from the public and 
publicity. This condition embraces all those personal facts which the person concerned has 
determined himself to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which 
he has the will that they be kept private”. 
The aforementioned definition illustrates that factors such as an individual’s conduct and role 
in society will influence the scope of what his private information would entail and the extent 
to which such private information will be protected by law. One must also demonstrate the 
need to have such information kept private, and a failure to do so insinuates that one does not 




Furthermore, in recent judicial decisions such as Media 24 (Pty) Ltd and others v Department 
of Public Works and others,
39
Craig Smith and Associates v Minister of Home Affairs and 
                                                             
30
J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 29. 
31
SD Warren & LD Brandeis ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193. 
32
Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 788-789. 
33
Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 30 above) 29. 
34
South African Law Reform Commission Discussion paper 109 (Project 124) Privacy and Data Protection 
(2009)16 (hereafter referred to as the SALRC Discussion Paper). 
35
I Currie ‘The concept of privacy in the South African Constitution: reprise’ (2008) TSAR 3. 
36
J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (LLD thesis UNISA 1976) 287. 
37
1996(3) SA 262(SCA). 
38
See National Media Ltd v Jooste (note 37 above) 271. 
39
2016(3) All SA 870 (KZP). In this case, the applicants were media houses who sought access to the 
disciplinary proceedings instituted by the first respondent against eleven of its employees in relation to the 
upgrades made to the President’s Nkandla residence. The court had to weigh the applicants right to freedom of 
expression against the privacy rights of the respondent and its employees and the court held that the right to 






and Minister of Police and others v Kunjana,
41
the courts have stressed that in order to 
determine whether a violation of the right to privacy has occurred, the right to privacy must 
be weighed against all competing interests. Such decisions have further illustrated that the 
right to privacy is jealously protected and will not be overridden without proper justification. 
 
Advanced technology has made it effortless for an individual’s personal information to be 
exploited to the extent that data users such as direct marketers are able to use sophisticated 





 submits that privacy is often threatened because individuals are not 
even aware that their personal information is held by another, what such information entails 
and for what purposes it is being used. 
 
This chapter will examine the right to privacy in its common law and constitutional forms, as 
well as consider the international treatment of the right to privacy in order to gauge an 
understanding of the extent of protection offered to an individual’s personal information in 
SA. The right to privacy in the context of direct marketing will be further considered in 
chapter 4 in terms of the CPA, ECTA and POPI. 
 
2.2 The common law right to privacy 
The purpose of considering the common law position in detail despite the existence of 
statutory remedies is that the common law was in existence prior to the enactment of the 
various statutes and therefore has arguably laid a solid foundation on which the regulatory 
framework could be built. Furthermore, the common law provides a self-standing remedy for 
the infringement of privacy (to be considered below) which may still be relied on by 
consumers should statute not offer sufficient protection.  
                                                             
40
2015 (1) BCLR 81 (WCC). In this case, the applicants were a law firm suspected of committing fraudulent 
activities and the respondents were acting based on warrants obtained to search the applicant’s premises for 
evidence in this regard. The court held that the applicant’s right to privacy had to be weighed against the 
respondents right to search and seize evidence. An order was crafted to allow the applicants premises to be 
searched within reason and in compliance with their right to privacy which s imultaneously satisfied the need for 
justice.  
41
Note 1 above. In this case, the court held that warrantless searches conducted by police officials  in terms of 
the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992,where no urgency exists, breaches the right to privacy of an 
individual and accordingly declared section 11(1)(a) and (g) of the act to be unconstitutional. 
42
J Burchell ‘The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A Transplantable Hybrid’ (2009) EJCL11. 
43




The actio iniuriarum is a delictual common law remedy which protects the right to dignity. 
Dignity in this form includes the right to privacy
44
 and so privacy does not exist as a separate 
right under the common law. In the landmark case of O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd,
45
Watermeyer AJ interpreted the common law concept of dignitas to 
include that of privacy and it has since been recognised as an independent right of personality 
in several other decisions.
46
 
Broadly, the common law invasion of privacy can be divided into interferences with an 
individual’s private life and disclosures of private information.
47
According to Neethling, the 
unauthorised collection or storage of personal information should be considered to be in 
principle contra bonos mores and thus prima facie wrongful
48
 as individuals have the 
inherent right to have their information kept private.  
In the context of direct marketing, an intrusion of privacy would be for example when a 
direct marketer, without the consent of a consumer, approaches them at home to market 
products despite the consumer requesting that such marketing should cease. A disclosure in 
breach of the right to privacy would be for example, when a direct marketer discloses the 
personal information of a consumer to other direct marketers (or any other person) on an 
unauthorised basis. 
2.2.1 Requirements of the actio iniuriarum 
The requirements of the actio iniuriarum will be considered briefly below in the context of 
direct marketing: 
a) A factual violation of privacy 
The first requirement to be satisfied is that there must be an act (commission) or omission 
(failure to act) present so as to satisfy the “conduct” requirement.
49
 
                                                             
44
See for example Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger (note 16 above) 849. 
45
1954 (3) SA 244(C). 
46
See for example Bernstein v Bester (note 32 above) and H v W 2013 (5) BCLR 554 (GSJ). 
47
C.M. Van der Bank ‘The right to privacy – South African and comparative perspectives’ (2012) (1) European 
Journal of Business and Social Sciences 86. 
48
Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 30 above) 274. 
49




With regard to direct marketing, an act in the form of unlawfully sending a consumer 
communications when the consumer has demanded that such communications should cease 
would fulfil the conduct requirement. An example of an omission would be the failure to 
prevent an unauthorised disclosure of a consumer’s personal information. 
b) Wrongfulness 
The second requirement is that the conduct in question must have been wrongful. The 
enquiry into wrongfulness is policy based and takes into consideration the boni mores of 
society which is premised on the general criterion of reasonableness.
50
 It is essentially an 
objective analysis and is a twofold enquiry.  
The first leg to establish is whether in fact a legally protected interest, in this case, privacy, 
has been infringed with the result that the plaintiff has suffered harm.
51
 
The second leg entails examining whether such a violation or harm was caused in a legally 




In the context of direct marketing, the legally protected interest of the consumer i.e. the right 
to privacy, must be factually violated and the direct marketer must act in a legally 
reprehensible manner. Thus for example, if a direct marketer badgers the consumer for 
marketing purposes after the consumer has made it known that such conduct is unsolicited 
and should cease, the consumers right to privacy will be construed as being infringed upon in 
a legally reprehensible manner. 
c) Animus iniuriandi 
The third requirement is that the conduct must have been intentional or in other words, 
animus iniuriandi must be present. It is important to note that as soon as wrongfulness is 
                                                             
50
Loubser and Midlgey (note 49 above) 144. 
51
Loubser and Midlgey (note 49 above) 147. 
52




established, a rebuttable presumption of animus iniuriandi becomes operative.
53
The onus 
then shifts onto the defendant to rebut this presumption.
54
 
This element requires that the direct marketer should have intended to invade the privacy of 
the consumer by for example, sending unsolicited communications or by intentionally 
distributing the consumer’s personal information to other marketers. It appears therefore that 
a complainant will not be able to rely on the common law if a marketer negligently discloses 
his information as the fault element would be lacking.
55
 Accordingly, individuals will have to 
rely on statutory and constitutional rights and in particular on the rights encapsulated in 
POPI. 
2.2.2 Defences available to direct marketers under the common law 
A defendant marketer will be able to employ the usual defences that are traditionally 
available under the common law remedy. Such defences aim to exclude fault or 
wrongfulness
56
 and include, but are not limited to: consent given by the plaintiff for the use 
or disclosure of his personal information; a lack of intention on the part of the direct 
marketer; disclosures made in the public interest and the necessity
57
 to have access to the 
personal information of others for business purposes.
58
Additionally, the defendant may have 




In making use of such defences to negate the wrongfulness requirement, a balancing of rights 
needs to be performed in terms of which the marketer must prove that the infringement of the 
consumer’s privacy was reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, and was therefore 
not contra bonos mores. 
                                                             
53
Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 (3) SA 461 (W) 468. 
54
H Scott ‘Liability for the Mass Publication of Private Information in South African Law: NM and others v 
Smith and others (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae)’ (2008) 12.1 EJCL 2. 
55
Burchell (note 42 above) 11. 
56
Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 30 above) 240-253. 
57
A Roos The law of data (privacy) protection: A comparative and theoretical study  (LLD thesis UNISA 2009) 
574, 589. 
58
Jansen van Vuuren NO v Kruger (note 16 above) – the Appellate Division held that a doctor was not justified 
in relaying information about his patient’s HIV-positive status to another doctor during a game of golf. 
59
Bernstein v Bester (note 32 above) – directors summoned for interrogation under the Companies Act of 1976 




It is important to note that the aforementioned common law remedies are in addition to the 
statutory remedies
60
 currently offered to consumers. It is however likely once POPI is fully 
effective, that most violations relating to data privacy will be dealt with by the Information 
Regulator in accordance with POPI rather than relying on the common law.   
2.3 The constitutional right to privacy 
 
2.3.1 Overview of section 14 of the Constitution 
The supremacy of the Constitution is a value that is enforced in all aspects of the law and any 
law or conduct that is inconsistent with it is invalid.
61
Section 14(d) of the Constitution 
stipulates as follows:"Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have 
the privacy of their communications infringed". 
It is trite that constitutional rights are not absolute and thus the right to privacy may be 
limited in accordance with the limitations clause,
62
 if it is in the particular circumstances 
reasonable and justifiable to do so.
63
 
The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right to privacy.
64
 It can therefore be 
seen that the very entrenchment of the right to privacy in the Constitution is indicative of the 
importance that it holds in South African society. Such an entrenchment can even be said to 
impose on the state a positive obligation to take steps to afford neglected aspects of the right 
to privacy more robust protection, such as data privacy.
65
 
It is submitted that the aforementioned obligation has certainly begun to be fulfilled in light 
of the investigation into data privacy in the form of the SARLC Discussion Paper
66
 and the 
consequent promulgation of POPI. It is however further submitted that government and the 
Information Regulator continually evaluate the progress being made in aspects concerning 
                                                             
60
Statutory remedies to be examined in chapter 4. 
61
s2 of the Constitution. 
62
s36 of the Constitution.  
63
For example, in the aforementioned case of Media 24 (Pty) Ltd and others v Department of Public Works and 
others (note 39), the court limited the right to privacy against the right to freedom of expression for public 
benefit as it was reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances to do so. 
64
s7(2) of the Constitution. 
65
A Roos ‘Data Protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position’ (2007) SALJ 423. 
66




the protection of data privacy so as to ensure that the regulatory framework is consistently 
relevant to trends in society. 
2.3.2 Limitation of the constitutional right to privacy 
A direct marketer may evade liability for the infringement of the right to privacy if such an 
infringement can be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. It follows that if the 
marketer is alleging that his infringing conduct was not unlawful, the onus is on him to prove 
that the infringement was reasonable and justifiable on a balance of probabilities. 
In the context of direct marketing, an individual’s right to privacy will have to be balanced 
with the right of the direct marketer to conduct his business for financial gain. It is submitted 
that although access to personal information is important for businesses to operate, this need 
for information cannot be satisfied at the cost of an individual’s privacy. 
In order to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy, the legislature has promulgated 
various pieces of legislation which address the right of an individual to have their personal 
information kept private which includes the ECTA, CPA and POPI to be examined in further 
detail in chapter 4. 
2.4 An international perspective on the right to privacy 
The increased processing of personal information and emergence of the global market in the 
1980s led to many countries adopting data privacy legislation
67
 especially in relation to the 
transmission of information across national borders.
68
 
In an effort to harmonise data protection laws internationally, two fundamental international 
instruments evolved, namely the COE Convention and the OECD Guidelines. 
The rationale behind wanting to consolidate a legal framework for data protection was to 
ensure that when personal data is passed between countries, both states protect the 
information on an equal or better level, so that the rights of data subjects are respected and 
protected across borders. 
                                                             
67
Roos (note 65 above) 402. 
68




The international data privacy instruments to be discussed below contain similar data 
protection principles which are extremely reminiscent of the principles contained in POPI, 
and so they will be discussed further in paragraph 4.4.4.  
2.4.1 The COE Convention 
The COE Convention has had an enormous impact on the enactment of data privacy 
legislation around the world as it obligates its member states to enact relevant domestic law, 
however it does not allow the individual to derive direct rights from it.
69
 The COE 
Convention is the only binding international instrument in terms of data privacy.
70
 Chapter 2 
of the convention sets out various data protection principles that must be complied with. 
The convention has had a tremendous influence on SA as POPI has been expressly drafted on 




2.4.2 The OECD Guidelines 
Several years ago, Burchell
72
 was of the opinion that even though SA is lagging behind in 
promulgating comprehensive data protection legislation, the advantage of this delay would be 
that it would be able to draw from the experience of other countries and formulate legislation 
that would be compatible with the OECD Guidelines. It is submitted that such assessment, in 
hindsight was on point as POPI has been drafted with due consideration of the OECD 
Guidelines. 
Chapter 1 of the instrument contains 8 principles which member and non-member states are 
encouraged to comply with and these principles mirror those contained in POPI. It is however 
important to note that the OECD Guidelines are merely persuasive and are not binding on 
member states. Despite it not being mandatory, many countries have taken them into 
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consideration in drafting domestic legislation.
73
Furthermore, the guidelines do not prescribe 
how they are to be enforced by member states, and so enforcement is left to the states 
themselves. As a result, member states procure their own methods of enforcing the 
guidelines
74
 and it is possible that this may sometimes lead to a certain level of inconsistency 
across borders. 
In light of the above, and as will be discussed further in paragraph 6.2.2.2, the Information 
Regulator is equipped with investigative powers
75
which it may use to draw on the trends and 
experiences of other jurisdictions. In this regard, it is submitted that the Information 
Regulator take advantage of such powers so as to ensure that SA does not develop similar 
discrepancies or inconsistencies, but rather that our regulatory framework remains congruent 
with the best level of protection available. 
Another important aspect of the guidelines is that it may also be adopted by the private 
sector.
76
It is therefore possible for the direct marketing industry to adopt these guidelines 
directly instead of waiting on government to enact legislation.  
2.4.3 The EU Directive 
In 1995, the EU endorsed the EU Directive so as to synchronise the legislative framework of 
its member states. The EU Directive has been strongly influenced by the OECD Guidelines 
and the COE Convention, although it itself offers a greater level of protection to data 
subjects.
77
The purpose of the directive is to ensure the free flow of information between 




The members of the EU are obligated to implement its provisions into their domestic law and 
consumers may rely on the directive to enforce their rights.
79
 This means that the directive is 
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legally binding on member states and also gives rise to direct rights, unlike the COE 
Convention. The directive also influences data transfers to non-member states, as do the 
OECD Guidelines.
80
 Moreover, the EU Directive prohibits trans-border transfers to non-
member states that do not provide an adequate level of data protection and this is a crucial 
attribute that POPI has endorsed as well.
81
 
Articles 6 and 7 of the EU Directive sets out data protection principles which must be 
complied with. These principles are similar to those contained in the OECD Guidelines, the 
COE Convention as well as those contained in POPI and it is submitted that the reason for 
such similarity is to create globally uniform standards of data protection which may facilitate 
effective cross-border transmissions of personal information. 
Recent judicial decisions pertaining to EU data protection laws have illustrated the strict 
enforcement of such laws. For example, in 2014,
82
 the court of justice of the EU ruled that a 
Spanish complainant whose personal data in the form of an auction notice of his repossessed 
home, which was still searchable on Google Spain’s’ content even after the relevant 
proceedings against him had been resolved, had the right “to be forgotten” . Accordingly, the 
search engine had in fact infringed his privacy rights. The court held that even though the 
physical server of Google Spain was located outside Europe, in the United States of America, 
EU rules still applied to it since it had a branch in a member state that promoted the selling of 
advertising space offered by the search engine. Accordingly, Google Spain could not escape 
liability. Such judgements are illustrative of the territorial reach that EU data protection laws 
have and the extent to which a data subjects rights are entrenched in these pieces of law. 
2.4.4 Impact of the EU Directive on South Africa 
 
Article 25 of the EU Directive provides that third countries (countries which are not members 
of the EU), will not be allowed to transact personal information with member states if they do 
not have adequate data protection laws. It is the European Commission (EC) who will make a 
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determination as to whether a particular country has “adequate” data protection laws and this 




SA has substantial trading relations with members of the EU
84
 and it follows that if it wishes 
to continue transacting with member states, it will have to ensure that its data protection 
framework is on par with that of the EU.
85
This requirement should not be seen as an 
impediment, but rather as an opportunity for the country to implement legislation that is 
compliant with the highest global standard of data protection. In any event, once POPI is 
fully operative, in my view, SA will be in compliance with this standard of protection and in 
the interests of expediting this process, it is hoped that POPI will be proclaimed to be fully 
operational soon. 
 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
It can be seen that in order to vindicate the right to privacy, an individual will be able to rely 
on several sources of law for various remedies. It must be noted that with the common law 
protection of privacy, a remedy is only available to the individual for intentional acts of the 
direct marketer that are wrongful. In response to this, a consumer is not left entirely without 
protection. They may rely on section 14 of the Constitution as well as statutory law relating 
to direct marketing, especially POPI. 
With regard to the aforementioned components of EU law, Kuner comments that it is “only 
this mixture of respect for fundamental rights and flexibility towards the variety of data 
protection systems that exist around the world that can provide the conditions under which 
an international legal framework for data protection can eventually develop”.
86
 
These instruments have quite obviously impacted on the drafting of POPI as the conditions 
for lawful processing in POPI expressly conform to the principles contained therein.
87
 This 
means that when POPI becomes fully operative, direct marketers will be able to transfer 
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personal information to their international branches/counterparts should the law in those 
foreign countries meet the required standard.  
However, despite the existence of the various international instruments, they are sometimes 
not comprehensive enough to provide consumers with an immediate remedy
88
 as they tend to 
serve the purpose of an over-arching law that ought to be filtered down to states via 
additional legislation. Furthermore, most international instruments are only binding on 
member states, thus a non-member state usually bears no implications for non-compliance. 
It is submitted however, that the notion of creating a single piece of internationally binding  
data protection legislation, is a good one, but is extremely difficult to put into practice.
89
 This 
is because it will be difficult to obtain consensus as to what standard of law should be 
implemented as different states have different ideas of what is acceptable or not.
90
Secondly, 
there is dispute as to which international body should be the regulator of such a law.
91
 As 
such, it does not seem probable that one comprehensive global data protection framework 
will be practical. In the absence of such, it is nevertheless in SAs interests to comply with the 
EU data protection framework and the promulgation of POPI is indicative that the legislature 
is aware of this fact. 
POPI’s preamble specifically acknowledges the constitutional right to privacy and that this 
right “includes a right to protection against the unlawful collection, retention, dissemination 
and use of personal information”. It is therefore clear that the legislature’s intention was to 
give effect to the Constitution and not merely promulgate self-standing data protection 
legislation. It is submitted that this is indicative of a new frontier in the protection of personal 
information which empowers the consumer and which entrenches the notion of data privacy 
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Chapter 3: An analysis of direct marketing as a business practice in South Africa 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is likely that we have all experienced direct marketing in at least one of its forms. Either a 
random phone call from a financial service provider asking us whether we would like to 
partake in a newly launched insurance product, or from a chain store offering us further 
benefits if we opt to increase our credit limit.  
On its own, direct marketing need not be portrayed as an entirely consumer-unfriendly 
practice.
92
 In this regard, some researchers are of the opinion that direct marketing practices 
have the effect of awakening consumers to their data privacy concerns.
93
 It also plays a 
crucial role in making consumers aware of products and services. It is rather the abuse of 
direct marketing that leads to an undesirable impact on consumers.
94
 
Technology has evolved exponentially, and this in turn has bolstered a boom in the direct 
marketing industry.
95
Compared to several years ago, it is at present much easier to market 
products and services to consumers.
96
Often consumers will have no idea as to how their 
personal information was obtained by marketers who contact them. In this regard, it is 
submitted that there are specific agencies (or persons) which exist that compile lists 
consisting of the personal information of consumers.
97
These lists are accordingly made 
available to direct marketers for a price.
98
 There are also other unlawful methods of gathering 
the personal information of consumers and these include spoofing, harvesting, dictionary 
attacks, spyware, cookies and phishing.
99
 
This chapter will consider direct marketing solely as a form of business practice in SA. An 
analysis of direct marketing in light of statutory law shall be considered in detail in chapter 4.  
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Mason (note 43 above) 146 - where he states “Mail advertisements are a reminder that there are agencies 




See B Hamann & S Papadopoulos ‘Direct marketing and spam via electronic communications: An analysis of 
the regulatory framework in South Africa’ (2014) 1 De Jure 46-47, for a comprehensive explanation as to what 




3.2 Forms of direct marketing 
Direct marketing can take the form of personally approaching a consumer or it can fall within 
the ambit of electronic communications such as telephonic or email and/or short message 
service communications (SMS).
100
 The former is relatively simple to understand as it 
involves the marketer physically approaching the consumer to sell their product or service. 




a) multimedia messages (MMS’s) and SMS’s which are sent directly to an individual’s 
mobile phone; 
b) applications for mobile electronic devices often contain pop-up marketing 
advertisements; 
c) marketing via email; 
d) the use of meta-tags (keywords written in computer code) to optimise the likelihood 
of a website appearing as priority results on an internet search engine;
102
 
e) pay-per-click advertising, where certain keywords are paid for by 
advertisers/marketers, and such payment ensures a prominent placement in the search 
results; 
f) social media marketing, for example, advertisements placed on Facebook;103 
g) affiliate marketing, where affiliates endorse products and services reciprocally and get 
some form of satisfaction (usually money) upon the happening of a specified event;
104
 
h) banner advertising, where static banners and pop ups make appearances when 
consumers are surfing the internet; 
i) voicemail marketing, where an advertisement is recorded on a personal voice 
mailbox; 
j) couponing, where retailers make daily coupon deals available online for consumers 
and in order to have access to them, consumers must sign up with their information in 
order to be able to receive notices about daily deals; and 
k) spam, which will be examined in greater detail in paragraph 3.3 below. 
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It is important to note that direct marketing, regardless of the form it takes can either be 




There is a fine line differentiating spam and direct marketing, in that spam is construed as 
being one of the forms of direct marketing. Not all spam will constitute direct marketing, and 
not all direct marketing will constitute spam,
106
 however with the rise of electronic direct 
marketing tactics, this distinction often becomes blurred and will be explained further below. 
3.3 What is spam? 
There is no settled legal definition of spam other than the interpretation put forth and 
accepted by the parties in the case of Ketler Investment CC t/a Ketler Presentations v Internet 
Service Providers’ Association
107
(the Ketler Judgement) in which spamming was defined as 
“the sending of bulk unsolicited emails or the sending of bulk commercial emails”.
108
 
Further, several academics have varying interpretations of the term, for example, Tladi has 
defined spam as “unsolicited email or electronic junk mail”,
109
 and Buys defines it as 
“unsolicited bulk and/or commercial electronic communications”.
110
 The difference between 
the aforementioned definitions is that the former seems to include non-commercial 
communications, whereas the latter excludes it. In this regard, Geissler submits that spam 
should not be defined solely on the basis of whether it is commercial or not, but other factors 
should also be considered such as the nature of the communications.
111
 It is therefore 
submitted that the definition used in the Ketler Judgement eliminates discrimination between 
commercial and non-commercial communications and is accordingly a good departure point 
for investigations into spam related matters.  
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Further to the above, Hamann and Papadopoulos submit that:  
“It is more inclusive than direct marketing, and can include, fraudulent and deceptive 
content, hoaxes, virus warnings, urban legends, jokes, chain letters, newsletters, opinion 
surveys, requests for support or donations and hate mail, that is, non-commercial electronic 
communications as well as it can be used to transmit viruses and malicious code”.112 
Spam has been described as being “the bane of the existing information age”
113
 and most 
people identify spam by it being communications that are deceptive for example, receiving a 
random email from an unknown source saying that you have won the lottery and in order to 
claim your prize, you will need to provide your banking details. It is at this point that direct 
marketing becomes distinguishable from spam, as direct marketers aim to sell you their 
products and/or services, whereas spammers generally want to deceive their recipients out of 
money, personal information or both.  
There are three main types of spam: “unsolicited electronic messages” (UEM); “unsolicited 
commercial electronic messages” (UCE) and “unsolicited bulk electronic messages” 
(UBE).
114
 ECTA, along with the CPA and POPI, regulates UCE, although it is important to 
note that the CPA restricts itself to a much narrower form of UCE being direct marketing.
115
 
Such a narrow definition of UCE as per the CPA excludes a considerable scope of 
communications, which although are not commercial in nature, still constitute spam and 
which may take the forms outlined by Hamann and Papadopoulos above. 
This means that consumers are left unprotected from communications which do not constitute 
UCE and not only does this greatly inconvenience consumers, it further does not cure the 
scourge of spam.
116
 It is however submitted that POPI is a significant improvement on the 
aforementioned pieces of legislation as it aims to protect personal data regardless of the form 
that it takes
117
 especially because it does not limit its protection to commercial electronic 
communications only. 
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As this dissertation is focussed on direct marketing, spam will only be considered to the 
extent that it constitutes direct marketing. This means that in taking into account the opt-in 
mechanism that POPI creates (as will be further examined in paragraph 4.4.5), spammers will 
no longer be able to send spam, unless an individual has consented to it.  
3.4 The advantages and disadvantages of direct marketing 
As with any commercial practice, there are both positive and negative components to it.  
Direct marketing is no exception, and its pertinent advantages and disadvantages will be 
considered below. 
3.4.1 Advantages of direct marketing 
a) By our very nature, human beings will consume and desire things that are most often 
provided by some external source. The need for such things is satisfied by the 
financial drive to supply them by manufacturers and suppliers. This process is the 
fundamental lifeblood of the economy, and if carried out responsibly, it can prove to 
be a very useful tool for SA’s emerging economy.
118
 
b) Employment opportunities are created and this in turn sustains the livelihoods of those 
employed by direct marketing companies, as well as contributes to the economy and 
upliftment of society as a whole.
119
 
c) Certain marketing strategies such as email marketing, are a cost effective and efficient 
way of contacting consumers and facilitating businesses.
120
 
d) Direct marketing contributes to the free flow of information both domestically and 
internationally. This facilitates the process of economic growth and stability, as those 
who wish to engage in the practice, have the will to do so knowing that they have a 
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3.4.2 Disadvantages of direct marketing122 
a) Unsolicited direct marketing encroaches on the privacy of consumers and in this way 
infringes a consumer’s right to have their personal information kept private.
123
 
b) It is also bothersome to a consumer as consequently, the consumer who was never 
interested in the communications in the first place has to now take the time, cost and 
effort to opt out of the communication.
124
 
c) Unsolicited marketing and spam further jeopardises the internet security of an 
individual as their personal data is left unprotected and unduly accessible.
125
  
d) Consumers are often inundated with information when they consume products and 
services to the extent that they sometimes unknowingly permit the transmission of 
their personal information for the purposes of direct marketing.
126
 Once a consumer 
does this, their information can be used for purposes that they had never intended it to 
be used for. 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
Direct marketing in itself is not an unsavoury practice as it is useful in facilitating the chain 
of supply and demand, creating employment opportunities and thereby contributing to 
economic stability in SA.  
The practice becomes undesirable when direct marketers circumvent the law to infringe on 
the rights of consumers. Not only does unsolicited direct marketing greatly inconvenience 
consumers, it simultaneously violates their right to have their personal information kept 
private. Furthermore, the blurred distinction between direct marketing and spam creates 
considerable confusion for consumers as they are unlikely to vindicate their statutory rights 
simply because they are unaware of what these rights may be and what they are in relation to.  
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It is however submitted that the broad view taken by POPI to regulate all uses of personal 
information will considerably clear up such confusion experienced by consumers, provided 
that consumers educate themselves about the changing legislative landscape and the 




Moreover, in order for direct marketing to be holistically and commercially beneficial to all 
stakeholders involved, an improved system of regulation is needed. This issue will however 
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Chapter 4: An examination of the regulatory framework regarding direct marketing 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The rationale for the promulgation of data protection legislation in SA lies in the inherent 
respect for the privacy of an individual as entrenched in our Bill of Rights.
128
 Privacy is also 




In this context of consumer-centric privacy legislation, direct marketing is a business practice 
which may intrude on the privacy of an individual should it be unsolicited.
130
 Examples of 
South African legislation which address the practice of direct marketing include the ECTA, 
CPA and POPI, and these statutes shall be considered in further detail below. 
4.2 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
ECTA became effective in SA on 30 August 2002 and was considered to be at the forefront 
of communications and information technology law.
131
 Its primary objective is “to facilitate 
electronic communications and transactions in the public interest”.
132
 The drafters of ECTA 
elected to regulate and not prohibit unsolicited UCE and in this regard, its application is 




Section 42(3) of ECTA provides that Chapter VII (Consumer Protection) does not apply to a 
regulatory authority established in terms of a law if that law prescribes consumer protection 
provisions in respect of electronic transactions. This has been construed by some authors to 
mean that if another piece of legislation subjects electronic consumer transactions to superior 
consumer protection laws, then Chapter VII of ECTA will not apply.
134
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The plain meaning of the word “unsolicited” means that the consumer did not consent to 
receiving a particular communication,
135
 and the plain meaning given to “commercial”  
involves something that is business related.
136
 Thus, if a communication is not commercial in 
nature such as a hoax email, it will not be classified as a UCE in terms of ECTA.
137
 
4.2.1 Noteworthy definitions contained in ECTA 
It is interesting to note that ECTA does not define direct marketing. Conversely, the concept 
is defined in the CPA and POPI and it is submitted that consumers may use these definitions 
as a guideline to decipher the precise meaning of the term.
138
 
It is submitted that the lack of such a definition in ECTA may lead to a blurred distinction 
between UCE and direct marketing. The aforementioned distinction is imperative as not all 
direct marketing constitutes UCE or spam and vice versa.
139
 For example, a consumer may 
receive emails about sales from a particular retailer and this would constitute direct marketing 
and would be lawful under ECTA until such time the consumer opts-out of the 
communication. It does not then mean that since this communication was unsolicited, that 
such will constitute spam as the consumer may very well accept the communication.  
A “consumer” is defined as “any natural person who enters or intends entering into an 
electronic transaction with a supplier, as the end-user of the goods or services offered by that 
supplier”.
140
 The emphasis on “end user” implies that the section will not apply to a 
consumer who for instance re-sells a product or service to other consumers. Some authors are 
of the opinion that this definition should be extended to include juristic persons as businesses 




The term “personal information” is given quite a comprehensive definition. Briefly, it refers 
to the information about an identifiable individual including race and information relating to 
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the educational or medical history of the individual amongst several other things.
142
This 
definition does appear to be broad enough to encompass those details of a consumer which 
may be used for the purposes of direct marketing. 
4.2.2 Chapter 8 of ECTA 
Chapter 8 of ECTA stipulates that a data controller
143
 must obtain the express written 
permission of the data subject
144
 for the collection, collation, processing or disclosure of any 
personal information relating to the data subject,
145
 and must disclose in writing the specific 




In the context of direct marketing and spam, it envisages that the marketer must obtain the 
consent of the consumer before making use of their personal information and must outline 
what marketing practices their information will be used for. As mentioned in chapter 2, in 
practice, many consumers are often unaware that their information is being processed in the 
first place,
147
 and this appears to be a fundamental flaw of this provision. For example, if a 
consumer is unaware that their information is being used - such a consumer is unlikely to 
exercise their rights under this provision in ECTA in any event. 
4.2.3 Section 45- The regulation of commercial electronic communications 
Section 45 of ECTA provides that: 
“(1) Any person who sends unsolicited commercial communications to consumers, must 
provide the consumer 
(a) with the option to cancel his or her subscription to the mailing list of that person; 
and 
(b) with the identifying particulars of the source from which that person obtained the 
consumer's personal information, on request of the consumer”. 
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It is therefore clear that ECTA affords consumers an opt-out mechanism and it is submitted 
that this provision is flawed and its drawbacks will be discussed in paragraph 4.2.5 below. 
The primary concern, as will be seen, is that consumers may be inundated with 
communications until they have requested that such communications should cease. Moreover, 
ECTA does not specifically state how the opt-out function should be made available and so 
direct marketers use this as a means to circumvent the law.  
In respect of clause 45(1)(b) above, it is submitted that ECTA is more onerous in its 
application than the CPA for example, which does not put forth such a requirement.  
However, a possible downfall of this provision is that should a consumer query as to how a 
direct marketer obtained their contact details, in doing so they confirm the correctness and 
availability of such information.
148
 This may then result in even more unsolicited 
communications being sent to that consumer. 
Until recently, there has been a lack of judicial interpretation regarding spam in SA. 
However, in 2014, the landmark Ketler Judgement was handed down relating to spam and 
section 45 of ECTA - it essentially held that the Internet Service Providers’ Association 
(ISPA) did not comply fully with section 45 in that it did not reveal the source from which it 
had obtained its data from. This case will however be examined in further detail below. 
4.2.4 Analysis of the Ketler Judgement 
The Ketler Judgement was the first South African case to be decided in relation to 
spam.
149
Ketler, the applicant, contended that the respondent, ISPA, had engaged in 
defamatory conduct by listing it on its website page entitled “Hall of Shame”, which was 
reserved for the senders of spam. Ketler was a sender of bulk emails and it used an 
independent internet service provider to do so.  
Ketler instituted action to remove its name from the “Hall of Shame” listing, as well as to 
interdict the re-listing of its name. It put forth the following arguments in support thereof:
150
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a) By engaging in spam, it did not act unlawfully as spamming is permitted in SA 
provided there is compliance with section 45 of ECTA, which according to Ketler, it 
had complied with. 
b) As ISPA is a self-regulatory, voluntary body, Ketler, who was not a member thereof, 
was accordingly not subject to its code of conduct and could therefore not be subject 
to its “Hall of Shame” listing. It contended that even if it was a member of ISPA, it 
would still not be entitled to list its name as there was compliance with the law. 
c) An undertaking not to spam, which was signed by Ketler, had no legal force and 
effect as it was not a member of ISPA. 
ISPA invoked several defences including truth, public interest and consent, and essentially 
averred that as per the defences, it was permitted to list Ketler on its “Hall of shame” for 
spamming. 
The court held that Ketler had not complied fully with section 45 of ECTA, as subsect ion 3 
requires a sender of spam to reveal the source from which it had obtained a recipient’s  
personal data from, if so requested. In the courts view, Ketler had failed to do so and 
accordingly did not comply with ECTA. 
The judgement is significant because it illustrates that provided there is compliance with 
section 45, spamming is lawful in SA. It is however submitted that when POPI becomes fully 
operational and replaces the opt-out regime in ECTA with its opt-in regime, that this aspect 
of the judgement will become redundant. 
Further significance of the judgement relates to the pioneering of the importance of self-
regulatory approaches to spamming, which could extend to the direct marketing industry as 
well. This is because ECTA establishes a self-regulatory framework and in terms of section 
71, an industry body for service providers may be recognised by the Minister of 
Communications provided that certain requirements are met, being - membership of the body 
must be subject to adequate criteria; the codes of conduct must be adequate and the 
representative body must be capable of monitoring and enforcing compliance with its 
codes.
151
 ISPA is recognised as such a representative body under ECTA and accordingly the 
court found that its code of conduct is part of the self-regulatory framework sanctioned by 
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 Furthermore, ISPA’s code of conduct was recognised as being in the public interest 
in so far as dealing with spam was concerned.
153
 
Some authors are of the opinion that the Ketler Judgement has invited uncertainty as to the 
place of self-regulation in SA and has “revealed an industry practice as clear as 
dishwater”,
154
 as it is unclear how statutory regulation and self-regulatory approaches to 
spamming coincide. Pistorius and Tladi submit that industry specific self-regulatory practices 
and national legislation need to be aligned so as to have an effective system of co-regulation. 
This issue will however be considered further in paragraph 6.4. 
4.2.5 Drawbacks of section 45155 
The section does not stipulate how the opt-out mechanism should be made available and so 
often direct marketers either do not provide a mechanism to opt-out, or if they do, it is either 
dysfunctional, falsified or hardly visible in the communication.
156
 This leads to tremendous 
abuse of the provisions of ECTA, and it is the unsuspecting consumer who then bears the 
brunt, especially in relation false contact details, as this practice is not prohibited by ECTA. 
The burden of opting out remains on the consumer. This means that the consumer becomes 
inundated with direct marketing until they take the effort to opt-out. Not only is this 




It is further submitted that the legislature’s decision to only regulate spam and not prohibit it 
via ECTA, encourages spammers as the only instance in which communications become 
unlawful, is when the recipient has opted-out, and the spammer or marketer persists.
158
 
Perhaps the rationale was to promote the free flow of information, however such intention is 
being overridden by circumvention and abuse of ECTA. POPI will in any event render this 
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flaw insignificant as it will require opt-in consent to be obtained before communications can 
be sent to consumers.
159
 
It is important to note that ECTA does not regulate other forms of direct marketing, such as 
unsolicited telephone calls to consumers.
160
 It is at this point that ECTA must be 
supplemented with the CPA and POPI. Furthermore, in light of the aforementioned 
drawbacks of section 45, it is submitted that ECTA falls short of the standard of protection 
required to adequately shield consumers from spam and unwanted direct marketing.
161
 
4.2.6 Non-compliance with ECTA 
A failure to comply with the relevant provisions will constitute an offence and the truant 
sender of communications can face penalties which include fines and imprisonment of up to 
twelve months.
162
However, seeing as though most marketers are able to circumvent its 
provisions, in any event, they simultaneously circumvent the sanctions contained therein. 
Furthermore, to date, it is unheard of that a marketer has been imprisoned for sending 
unsolicited communications which further illustrates that the penalties have far more bark 
than bite. 
4.3 Consumer Protection Act 
The rationale behind the promulgation of the CPA lies in the fact that the state recognised 
there was a severe need for the regulation of consumer markets and for the general protection 
of consumers.
163
 As a result, the CPA was promulgated and became effective on 31 March 
2011. 
4.3.1 Purpose and application of the CPA 
The CPA applies to all transactions which materialise in SA and to the promotion of any 
goods or services, unless they are so exempt by the Act.
164
 As will be discussed below, this 
restrictive application may sometimes be to the detriment of the unsuspecting consumer who 
receives communications from beyond the borders of SA.  
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4.3.2 Noteworthy definitions in the CPA165 
The CPA’s definition of a consumer is considerably wide and includes both natural and 
juristic persons whose asset value or annual turnover at the time of the transaction is less than 
two million rand. In this regard, the CPA has a wider application than ECTA, as ECTA 
applies only to natural persons. 
There are two methods of direct marketing in the definition, i.e. either directly and in person 
to the consumer, for example door to door marketing; or indirectly, by post or electronic 





4.3.3 A consumer’s right to restrict unwanted direct marketing 
Section 11 of the CPA regulates the consumer’s right to restrict unwanted direct marketing. 
The consumer has the right to refuse to accept direct marketing attempts, to require the 
marketer to discontinue its marketing, or to apply to pre-emptively block such a marketing 
attempt.
167
This section effectively creates an opt-out mechanism for consumers similar to the 
mechanism contained in ECTA. 
Some authors are of the opinion that section 11 is ineffective in dealing with the difficulties 




If a consumer wishes to opt-out of any communication, they must demand, during, or within 
a reasonable time after the receipt of such communication, that the marketer discontinues 
contacting them,
169
and once such a demand is met, or if the consumer has registered a pre-
emptive block
170
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4.3.4 The national opt-out registry 
The CPA states that the Consumer Commission (CC) may establish, or recognise a registry in 
which a consumer may register a pre-emptive block against any direct marketer.
172
 To date, 
the CC has not yet established such a registry. Furthermore, the lack of peremptory language 
in drafting this section by the use of the word “may” indicates that there is no obligation on 
the CC to establish the registry. The delay in the establishment of the registry has left 
consumers without a vital mechanism for a considerable period of time, however in any 
event, there is unlikely to be a need for the registry now since POPI will convert the status 
quo to an opt-in regime.
173
 
4.3.5 The Direct Marketing Association of South Africa (DMASA) 
In the absence of the national opt-out registry discussed above, the DMASA has stepped in to 
create an opt-out register.
174
 The DMASA will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6 of 
this dissertation,
175
 however it will be useful to examine the mechanics of the opt-out register 
it creates in this chapter. 
The DMASA website
176
 provides a national opt-out register in which consumers may indicate 
their preference not to be the recipients of direct marketing by certain businesses. The 
DMASA will then provide the details of the consumers who have opted out to its members 




The effectiveness of this opt-out register is however questionable. This is because the register 
only applies to the members of the DMASA, and this means that non-members may still 
continue to contact consumers.
178
 Furthermore, a member may still simply resign when they 
do not wish to comply with the set down rules, and this is indicative of a lack of enforcement 
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4.3.6 When may a consumer be contacted for direct marketing purposes? 




a) Sundays or public holidays; 
b) Saturdays before 9 am and after 1 pm; and 
c) all other days between 8pm and 8am. 
The exception to the aforementioned times is when the consumer has agreed expressly or 
impliedly otherwise.
181
 From the perspective of the direct marketer, they will not be in breach 
if they comply with the time period but for some reason the communication is received by the 
consumer during the prohibited times.
182
 In this case the onus of proof to show that the 
communication was sent during permitted times rests on the direct marketer.
183
 
4.3.7 Non-compliance with the CPA 
Non-compliance with the provisions of the CPA bears extremely grave consequences for 
truant direct marketers. They may face a criminal sanction of up to 12 months 
imprisonment
184
 and/or an administrative penalty that is either 10% of the marketer’s annual 
turnover in the preceding financial year or R1 million,
185
 whichever is greater. As with the 
criminal sanctions in ECTA, it is unheard of that a marketer has been imprisoned for non-
compliance with the CPA. 
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4.4 Protection of Personal Information Act 
POPI was the brain child of the South African Law Commission’s investigation into a lack of 
data privacy legislation in SA.
186
 On insistence by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development, the commission produced its preliminary findings in the form of discussion 
paper 109,
187
 and thereafter its final findings and recommendations together with a draft 
POPI Bill in 2009. 
It is important to note that both the discussion paper and the draft POPI Bill relied heavily on 




POPI was thereafter signed into law by the President on the 26th of November 2013.  As 
stated previously, although it has been promulgated, it is not yet fully operational as there are 
limited sections that have taken effect. Since then, progress has been made in so far as 
establishing the Information Regulator is concerned as the National Assembly approved the 




Section 114 of POPI regulates the transitional arrangements relating to the Act and stipulates 
that when POPI becomes fully operative, companies will then be given a year’s grace period 
to comply, unless this grace period is extended by the Minister on request or of his own 
accord and after consultation with the Information Regulator.
190
Such extension may not 
however exceed a period of three years.
191
This section further creates exclusions, for 
example, processing of information that is subject to prior approva l by the Information 
Regulator as outlined in section 57 of POPI that is taking place on the date of commencement 
of the Act, need not comply with the notification requirements set out in section 58. Such 
provisions are indicative of the legislature’s intention to make the transition by all parties into 
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4.4.1 The purpose of POPI 
Broadly, the purpose of POPI is to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy by 
protecting personal information and regulating the free flow and processing of personal 
information,
193
 and such purpose signifies the legislature’s recognition that SA was in need of 
specialised data protection legalisation that would give effect to this right.
194
 
The drafters of POPI took care to explicitly mention that it aims to provide rights to data 
subjects in terms of unsolicited communications and automated decision making. Neither the 
CPA, nor ECTA provides so in their preambles. This is significant as it demonstrates that 
POPI does not aim to merely regulate data processing, but to do so for the purposes of 
protecting the right to privacy as enshrined in the Constitution. 
The preamble of POPI quite succinctly encompasses what it is that SA needs in terms of data 
protection. It acknowledges that we live in a society that is always evolving with regard to 
technology and that in response to such changes, the data protection framework “requires the 
removal of unnecessary impediments to the free flow of information, including personal 
information”.
195
Furthermore, the preamble also acknowledges that our data protection 
framework needs to match international standards, so as to encourage the free flow of 
information across borders.  
4.4.2 Application of POPI 
POPI applies to the processing of personal information entered into a record by or for a 
responsible party by making use of automated or non- automated means.
196
 It will also apply 
to both public and private bodies. Furthermore, it applies to the exc lusion of any other 
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legislation unless such legalisation offers more protection to the lawful processing of personal 
information than POPI itself.
197
 
It does however contain some exclusions which can be found in sections 6 and 7. Of 
particular significance is the exclusion relating to the processing of personal information 
solely for the purpose of journalistic, literary or artistic expression to the extent that such 
exclusion is necessary to reconcile, as a matter of public interest, the right to privacy with the 
right to freedom of expression.
198
  
The Act provides in respect of the above section that a balancing of rights needs to occur
199
. 
Moreover, the exclusion would only be available if the journalist for example, proves that the 
data subjects’ right to privacy is outweighed by the interests of the public in having access to 
the data subject’s private information.
200
 In the context of direct marketing, it may be 
contended by the marketer that they are simply exercising their right to freedom of expression 
as contained in the Constitution
201
because their communications constitutes commercial 
advertising which can accordingly be construed as commercial expression as set out in the 
Constitution.
202
 On the other hand, the data subject may rely on their right to privacy, and it is 




4.4.3 Noteworthy definitions contained in POPI204 
The definition of consent provides that three elements must be present in order for a direct 
marketer to adequately obtain the consent of a data subject. The consent must be free of any 
form of undue influence or duress, and so must be given freely and voluntarily by the 
consumer. Secondly, the consumer must give specific consent to a particular direct marketer 
for specific communications, and thirdly it must be an informed expression of will, meaning 
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that a consumer must consent, having had the capacity to understand what they are 
consenting to. 
The definition of direct marketing is mirrored as in the CPA and refers to commercial 
communications as does ECTA, however it is wider than the definition in ECTA as it also 
caters for attempts to request donations from the data subject. It can be construed from this 
definition, that a recipient will not be protected under POPI if they should receive non-
commercial communications, unless that communication requests some sort of donation “of 
any kind”.   
POPI’s definition of “electronic communication” is considerably dissimilar than the CPA’s 
and ECTA’s definitions, and is defined as “any text, voice, sound or image message sent over 
an electronic communications network which is stored in the network or in the recipient’s 
terminal equipment until it is collected by the recipient.” This is because the CPA covers 
telephonic direct marketing, whilst POPI does not, and ECTA includes “voice”, only where it 
is used in an automated transaction, whereas POPI includes it as any electronic 
communication. Furthermore, because of the requirement that the communication must be 
stored in the network or in the recipient’s terminal equipment until it is collected by the 
recipient, a direct marketing attempt via a telephone call will probably not be covered by 
POPI, as such a call is unlikely to be stored as required by POPI.
205
 
The definition also does not include situations in which direct marketers may obtain a data 
subjects’ personal information through online means such as software. In this regard it is 
submitted by Hamann and Papadopoulos, that the definition of electronic communication in 
POPI is far too narrow, even more so than the definitions in the CPA and ECTA, and they 
accordingly comment that the latter’s definitions should be used instead.
206
 
The definition of personal information contained in POPI is fairly comprehensive
207
 and is 
applicable to both natural and juristic persons and encompasses information that rela tes to an 
identifiable juristic or natural person, which includes but is not limited to information such as 
gender to contact details for example.
208
 This position differs from ECTA, as it only applies 
to natural persons. With regard to the CPA’s definition of “consumer”, it indicates a 
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monetary threshold requirement that juristic persons must meet in order for the CPA to apply 
to them - POPI indicates no such requirement. Thus, it can be said that POPI has somewhat 
of a wider application than the CPA and ECTA as POPI recognises that juristic persons may 
also have a right to privacy in particular circumstances.
209
 
POPI’s definition of “processing” is fairly wide and when analysed, seems to encompass any 
possible action that can be taken in relation to personal information and includes collecting, 
storing, altering, distributing and the destruction of such information amongst other things.
210
 
It is submitted that the actions taken by direct marketers in sourcing, storing and contacting 
consumers would accordingly be construed as “processing” such information.  
4.4.4 Conditions for lawful processing 
POPI is premised on eight key conditions which direct marketers and other business will have 
to comply with.
211
As mentioned in chapter 2, these conditions bear striking resemblance to 
the principles contained in the COE Convention, the OECD Guidelines and the EU 
Directive.
212
 This is because the drafters of POPI appear to have taken care to ensure that 
POPI was in line with a globally accepted standard of best practice in respect of data 
protection.
213
 Briefly, the principles are as follows: 
214
 
a) Accountability 215 - direct marketers have an obligation to ensure that there is 
compliance with POPI in respect of the processing of personal information and may 
not process such information recklessly.
216
 Furthermore, marketers will remain 
accountable even if such information is passed onto third party users.
217
 
b) Processing limitation218- personal information must be collected directly from the data 
subject to the extent applicable;
219
 must only be processed with the consent
220
 of the 
data subject and must only be used for the purposes for which it was obtained.
221
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c) Purpose specification222- personal information must only be processed for the specific 
purpose for which it was obtained
223
 and must not be retained for any longer than it is 
needed to achieve such purpose. 
d) Further processing limitation224- further processing of personal information must be 
compatible with the initial purpose for which the information was collected.
225
 Should 
a direct marketer wish to use a consumer’s information for a purpose for which the 
consumer did not consent to, they must obtain further permission from that consumer. 
e) Information quality
226
- the direct marketer must ensure that information held by them 
is accurate and updated regularly and that the integrity of the information is 
maintained by appropriate security measures.
227
 
f) Openness 228 - there must be transparency between the consumer and the direct 
marketer, in so far as processing the consumers’ information for direct marketing 
purposes is concerned and the marketer must ensure that all documented processing of 
data is properly maintained.
229
 
g)  Security safeguards230- direct marketers must take reasonable steps to ensure that 
adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that personal information is being 
processed responsibly and is not unlawfully accessed.
231
 It is especially important to 
have a digital system of checks and balances, so as to eliminate human error.
232
 
h) Data subject participation 233 - the consumer must be alive to the fact that their 
information is being processed and must have provided their informed consent to such 
processing. They further have a right to request whether their information is held by a 
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direct marketer, to request the details of what such information constitutes and to 
request that their information be deleted from a marketers records.
234
 
The aforementioned conditions for lawful processing of information are generally regarded as 
being the globally accepted principles of data protection,
235
 and as a result these principles in 
POPI are congruent with that of the EU data protection framework, the COE Convention as 
well as the OECD Guidelines, illustrating that POPI is in fact on par with the best level of 
protection possible. It is therefore hoped that such principles are strictly implemented by 
direct marketers, and that enforcement of these principles are effectively carried out by the 
Information Regulator. 
4.4.5 Section 69 of POPI- The regulation of direct marketing 
POPI provides that the processing of personal information of a data subject for the purpose of 
direct marketing by means of any form of electronic communication, including automatic 
calling machines, facsimile machines, SMSs or e-mail, is prohibited unless the data subject 
has given their consent, or is a customer of the responsible party.
236
 
Section 69(1) (b) further provides that subject to subsection 3,
237
 personal information may be 
processed if the data subject is an existing customer of the responsible party. POPI therefore 
draws a distinction between a “prospective customer” and “an existing customer” of a 
responsible party.
238
 This distinction is significant as in the case of a “prospective customer”, 
explicit opt-in consent must be obtained for the processing of personal information and in the 
case of an “existing customer”, implicit consent will suffice so long as the data subject had 
previously consented to communications from that responsible party.
239
 The consent in 
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respect of an existing customer is however subject to further qualifications being that such 
consent must have been obtained in the context of a sale of goods and/or services; the new 
communications must be in respect of the marketers own goods and services and the data 
subject is given sufficient opportunity to object to receiving such communications.
240
 
It is clear that it was the legislature’s intention to reverse  the opt-out regimes of the CPA and 
ECTA, and create a new opt-in mechanism in POPI. In light of this change, direct marketers 
may not send communications to data subjects unless they have consented and in so far as 
spam is concerned, the new system renders spamming unlawful. 
This change is very much influenced by Chapter II of the EU Directive and is certainly 
welcomed as it shifts the burden of opting-out from the consumer and places it on the 
marketer to obtain consent before sending through communications.
241
 
POPI does however only require the direct marketer to obtain consent from the consumer 
once, provided they have not previously withheld consent, and that the communications are 
related to the business of the direct marketer which the consumer had consented to.
242
 This 
new requirement is bitter-sweet, as on one hand consumers will not be continuously badgered 
by marketers to obtain their consent, however on the other hand, once the marketer has 
obtained the consumers consent, they may inundate the consumer with communications until 
the consumer makes mention that they do not want to be contacted further. 
In this way, the opt-in mechanism if abused, may simply end up being a glorified opt-out 
mechanism, as the data subject will have to opt-out of communications which they have 




Section 69(2) of POPI appears to conflict with the pre-emptive block regime as set out in the 
CPA.
244
 This is because if marketers are allowed to contact consumers who have not 
previously withheld their consent, they may be able to do so even if the consumer had 
registered a pre-emptive block against them simply because POPI does not attempt to 
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accommodate the CPA in this aspect.
245
 It is submitted that this section be amended to 
incorporate the pre-emptive block system, in that consumers who have registered blocks 




POPI provides that the consumer must also be given a reasonable opportunity to object, free 
of charge and in a manner free of unnecessary formality, to the use of their or its electronic 
details.
247
 Yet again, POPI demonstrates the emphasis that it places on the rights of the data 
subject, in that the individual is not expected to bear unnecessary difficulty and 
inconvenience should they object to having their information used. 
Direct marketing communications must also contain the identity and contact details of the 
sender, so as to allow the data subject to halt the communications if they wish to do so.
248
 In 
comparison to the opt-out mechanisms in the CPA and ECTA, the above stated provision 
attempts to give the consumer recourse, should they wish to opt-out. However, as with any 
piece of law, truants will find a route to circumvent it. There is a possibility that marketers 
may still falsify their headers and contact details, disallowing the consumer to contact them. 
In this regard, it is the data subject who needs to report fraudulent details, so that fraudsters 
may face penalties for non-compliance. Like with ECTA and the CPA, POPI also does not 
stipulate how such contact details should be made available, and it is thus likely that the same 
problems will arise in the context of POPI.
249
 
In terms of the regulation of direct marketing, it is expected that since POPI did not repeal the 
sections relating to direct marketing in the CPA, both pieces of legislation would apply 
concurrently.
250
 De Stadler submits that in so far as investigating matters related to direct 
marketing is concerned, agreement will have to be reached between the Information 
Regulator and the CC on the way in which claims and investigations will be handled and in 
this regard comments that thus far, the CC has been reluctant to broker such agreements.
251
 It 
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is hoped that such concurrent application of the CPA and POPI is effectively managed by 
both regulators so as to ensure that consumers are sufficiently protected from tr uant 
marketers. 
4.4.6 Cross border transfers 
Chapter 9 of POPI regulates cross border transfers of personal data. The Act stipulates that a 
responsible party may not transfer a data subject’s personal information to a recipient in a 
foreign jurisdiction, unless such a recipient is subject to a law, binding corporate rules, or a 
binding agreement, which offers an adequate level of protection for such data.
252
It further 
provides that such “adequate protection” means that the law relating to data processing in the 




Cross border transfers are also permitted if the data subject consents to the transfer, if it is 
required for the performance of a contract between the data subject and responsible party, or 
the responsible party and a third party for the benefit of the data subject or the transfer is 
beneficial to the data subject, and his consent could not be reasonably obtained.
254
 
Thus in the context of direct marketing, a marketer for example, may not send a consumers’ 
details to its subsidiary in another country, unless such a company is able to demonstrate that 
the subsidiary complies with the aforementioned conditions. 
With regard to direct marketing communications that are received by consumers from foreign 
jurisdictions, it is unclear how such communications will be dealt with by POPI simply 
because POPI does not extend its application to foreign jurisdictions.
255
 It is submitted in this 
regard that perhaps the legislature underestimated the amount of and the impact of 
communications from foreign jurisdictions in SA,
256
 and it is further submitted that the 
legislature consider how such issues will be regulated.  
For example, the legislature could consider engaging and negotiating with other countries so 
as to formulate co-operative agreements for the regulation of direct marketing 
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communications that pass over national borders, with a view to avoid creating a vacuum 
within which foreign unsolicited communications may exist simply because domestic 
legislation does not apply to it.
257
 
4.4.7 Non-compliance with POPI 
The penalties for non-compliance with POPI are extremely robust and some authors are of 
the opinion that they are far too grave.
258
 It is therefore in their own interest that direct 
marketers comply with the provisions of POPI, or they may face a criminal sanction of 
imprisonment between 12 months and 10 years, or a fine of up to R10 
million.
259
Furthermore, section 100 of POPI provides that any person who obstructs or 
unlawfully influences the Information Regulator or any person acting on behalf of the 
Information Regulator is guilty of an offence. This demonstrates the independence and 
impartiality with which the legislature intended the Information Regulator to operate with. 
However, as stated in the case of both the CPA and ECTA, criminal sanctions are quite 
difficult to enforce in respect of violations of data privacy rights, as the police service simply 
may not take such violations as seriously as they would other crimes. Furthermore, to date 
and under the CPA and ECTA, it has been unheard of that a direct marketer has been 
imprisoned for violating these laws. It does however remain to be seen whether the 
Information Regulator turns the tide in this regard, and does in fact utilise its powers to 
implement harsh sanctions. 
4.4.8 Impact of POPI on direct marketers 
In as much as POPI aims to protect data subjects and their personal information, it also aims 
to balance the interests of direct marketers. For example, the emphasis that POPI places on 
security measures that a business ought to have is indicative that POPI also aims to cater for 
the needs of the marketer. POPI demands that direct marketers align their strategies in 
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compliance with its provisions, so as to offer goods and services to those consumers who 
should want it, and not to those who do not.
260
 
In light of the changes that POPI will effect to the direct marketing industry, it is submitted 
that direct marketers take the following steps to be POPI compliant:
261
 
a) Perform a regular audit of their database to determine when “opt-in” consent will be 
required from a consumer; 
b) ensure that where necessary, consumers have actually opted-in and delete personal 
information of those consumers who have not consented to direct marketing or who 
have opted-out of such communications; 
c) obtain the necessary advice to assist with the implementation of policies to protect 
and process personal information in line with POPI; and 
d) implement or tighten existing security measures so as to ensure that stored personal 





It is submitted that POPI is an improvement on the opt-out mechanisms afforded by the CPA 
and ECTA. However, the requirement that the direct marketer may only contact the data 
subject once becomes problematic as it is likely to be abused. In this regard, Hamann and 
Papadopolous comment that even though POPI is an improvement on the existing legislation, 
section 69(2) “reverts back to an opt-out model and is reduced to a second level protection 
mechanism. That is, it only becomes relevant after the approach has been made”. 
Furthermore, the discrepancies between the three pieces of legislation as discussed in this 
chapter need to be synchronised so as to disallow any particular situation from falling within 
the highlighted inconsistencies. 
The opt-in provision also appears to conflict with the CPA which states that direct marketers 
must assume that a pre-emptive block has been registered against them. POPI ignores this 
provision and it is submitted that this lack of clarification by the legislature makes it unclear 
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how the opt-out registry and the opt-in mechanism in POPI is to coincide, and that further 
clarification be provided in this regard.
263
 
In terms of application, it is intended that all three pieces legislation apply concurrently to the 
extent that they can.
264
 However, in certain aspects, it is expected that POPI will prevail over 
the CPA and ECTA
265
 and in the event of a conflict it is generally accepted that the laws 
which offer the most protection for consumers will apply.
266
 
For example, POPI does not cater for instances of personal direct marketing and on this 
occasion, the CPA will apply. More importantly, the CPA will always apply to the content of 
direct marketing, whereas POPI applies merely to the regulation of the process of extracting 
consumer personal information for purposes of direct marketing.
267
 This then means that 
should a consumer have a complaint about the content of the direct marketing 
communications that they are receiving, the consumer must approach the CC for relief, and 
not the Information Regulator.
268
 
In respect of the receipt of direct marketing communications from foreign jurisdictions, it is 
submitted that a significant criticism of POPI is that it does not extend its application to such 
communications. As mentioned above in paragraph 4.4.6 it is recommended that the 
legislature give this aspect due consideration so as to afford consumers the best possible 
protection. 
Furthermore and as will be discussed in paragraph 6.2.2, the success of POPI will depend 
largely on the effectiveness of the Information Regulator to perform its functions in so far as 
enforcing compliance with the Act is concerned. It is hoped that the Information Regulator 
will take due advantage of its allocated powers and duties so as to contribute to the protection 
of personal information and the effective regulation of direct marketing. 
Overall, POPI is a fundamental change to the status quo as it is SAs first piece of 
consolidated legislation relating to data protection. It further attempts to tip the scales in 
favour of the consumer so that the consumer is left feeling more empowered than before. It is 
submitted that this is the favoured position considering that SA is moving toward becoming a 
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consumer-centred society based on the values of informed consent, respect for the autonomy 








Chapter 5: The regulation of direct marketing in foreign jurisdictions  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In an effort to determine whether SA is internationally compliant in so far as data protection 
is concerned, this chapter will consider data protection legislation in two foreign jurisdictions, 
namely, the UK and NZ to the extent that such legislation is applicable to direct marketing. 
As a conclusion, a comparison will be drawn between the aforementioned legal systems, and 
that of SA’s so as to draw lessons that may be useful in so far as improving our data 
protection framework is concerned. 
5.2 United Kingdom 
5.2.1 Introduction 
As previously alluded to in chapters 2 and 4, POPI is extremely reminiscent of EU data 
protection laws,
269
 and it will therefore be seen that the UK data protection framework is 
similar to POPI. The UK’s system of regulation can be described as being one that is largely 
centred on statutory regulation
270
and one that does not have a written constitution or does not 
codify a constitutional right to privacy as does SA in the Bill of Rights.
271
 
In this light, the salient pieces of legislation applicable to direct marketing in the UK will be 
considered below so as to draw a comparison between the regulatory trends of the UK and 
SA. 
5.2.2 The Data Protection Act of 1998 (DPA) 
The UK, as a result of its EU membership, implemented the EU Directive in the form of the 
DPA.
272
It is enforced through the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and is the focal 
legislation in respect of data privacy. The provisions of the DPA were drafted in close 
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consideration of the COE Convention so that the UK could align itself with an internationally 
consistent standard of data protection.
273
 
5.2.2.1 Purpose and application of the DPA 
The DPA places obligations on data users before and during their use of such data and awards 
certain rights to individuals in respect of information held about them by such data users.
274
 
The purpose of POPI goes further than the above, in that the legislature chose to specifically 
carve out that POPI’s purpose is to give effect to the entrenched constitutional right to 
privacy. This is possible because SA has entrenched the right to privacy in the Constitution, 




The DPA applies only to the personal data of natural persons, whereas POPI applies to both 
natural and juristic persons, thereby illustrating that POPI has a wider application than the 
DPA. It is submitted in this regard that perhaps the drafters of POPI took cognisance of the 
fact that in the age of evolving technology and a growing market, both juristic and natural 
persons are exposed to direct marketing and should be afforded similar protection.  
There is no requirement in the UK for organisations to appoint a data protection 
officer
276
whereas POPI makes this appointment compulsory.
277
 This position is however 
likely change in light of article 35 of the proposed EU regulation,
278
 which makes the 
appointment of a data protection officer mandatory. 
5.2.2.2 Fundamental Principles of the DPA 
The DPA is premised on eight data protection principles which bear strikingly similar 
resemblance to the conditions for lawful processing in POPI. These principles can be said to 
have filtered their way down from the COE Convention and the EU Directive to the DPA, 
and similarly to POPI, as the drafters of POPI, were strongly guided by UK data protection 
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 It is submitted that in light of the strong influence of the UK data protection 
framework on the South African framework, SA could lean on the experiences of the UK to 
ensure the effective enforcement of POPI. This is especially significant since POPI gives the 
Information Regulator the power to conduct investigations into trends in foreign jurisdictions 




5.2.2.3 Cross-border transfers of personal information 
Cross-border transfers of personal information may only occur if the foreign jurisdiction 
provides adequate data protection
281
 or if the transfer is catered for in standard contractual 
clauses accepted by the EC, or if it is subject to an organisation’s binding corporate rules.
282
 
In addition, the ICO has published certain guidelines which can be used to assess whether a 




POPI contains similar conditions but goes further and explains what is meant by “adequate 





The DPA further states that transfers of personal data out of the European Economic Area
285
 
may only occur if it is consented to by the data subject; if it is essential to carry out a contract 
either between the data controller
286
 and the data subject,
287
 or a third party for the benefit of 
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The above conditions are similar to those contained in POPI, save for the latter three. This 
illustrates that the drafters of POPI perhaps did not intend for the latter three conditions to be 
reason enough to transfer data to a foreign jurisdiction, should it not have adequate data 
protection laws. 
 
5.2.2.4 Enforcement of the DPA 
The ICO is responsible for the enforcement of the DPA, and in the event that a data controller 
breaches the DPA, the ICO may issue an enforcement notice, compelling the data controller 
to rectify the breach.
289
 Should the data controller fail to do so, this will constitute a criminal 





Examples of recent sanctions enforced by the ICO include a penalty of £120,000 issued to a 
credit brokerage company called Digitonomy Limited on 13 February 2017 for sending a 
large amount of marketing texts without proper consent; and on 25 November 2016, the ICO 
fined a company named Silver Tech Limited an amount of £100,000 for sending spam.
291
It 
can therefore be seen that the DPA contains fair ly serious sanctions that are to date being 
executed by the ICO which further supports the UK’s strict approach to data protection.
292
 
Following from the UK in this regard, is POPI, with its similarly extreme penalties as 




5.2.2.5 The regulation of direct marketing under the DPA 
Direct marketing in the context of section 11 of the DPA means “the communication (by 
whatever means) of any advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular 
individuals”. This definition is considerably expansive, and can be said to include any 
possible method of communication to a data subject. 
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The DPA provides that an individual is entitled to require a data controller to cease, or not 
begin the processing of their personal data for the purposes of direct marketing, via notice in 
writing.
294
 Should the data controller fail to comply with the notice, the court may make any 
order it deems appropriate in the circumstances.
295
 
It can be seen that the DPA is similar to the CPA and ECTA in this regard, in that it 
essentially creates an opt-out mechanism for data subjects , and it is dissimilar to POPI’s opt-
in regime. The requirement of written notice goes a step further than the CPA and ECTA, as 
the DPA specifically stipulates how the opt-out mechanism should work. This is perhaps a 
lesson which SA can learn from the UK, considering that the opt-out mechanisms in the CPA 
and ECTA are riddled with inconsistencies.
296
 
The DPA does however provide a distinction between non-sensitive and sensitive data in that 
opt-in consent must be obtained for any direct marketing which involves the processing of 
sensitive personal data such as race, ethnicity, or medical conditions.
297
 The CPA and ECTA 
does not draw such a distinction, but POPI on the other hand, does.
298
 
5.2.3 The Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (PEC 
regulations) 
The PEC regulations operate alongside the DPA in that it states that “nothing in these 
Regulations shall relieve a person of his obligations under the DPA in relation to the 
processing of personal data”.
299
 It can therefore be construed as supplementing the DPA and 












 and electronic mail,
304
 and is said to create a “soft 
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 as it does not explicitly give a data subject the opportunity to opt-out, nor 
does it explicitly require a data subject to opt-in. Generally, opt-in consent is required for 
marketing emails sent to individual subscribers, unless the “soft opt-in” provisions mentioned 
above apply.
306
 As with the DPA, the restrictions on marketing by email only apply to natural 
persons. 
In addition to the above regulations, the directive also stipulates that communications may 
not be sent to data subjects if the identity and contact details of the sender, which a data 




The PEC regulations also set out to ensure that the consent received from the data subject is 
informed and indicate a positive expression of will
308
 by for example , the marketer providing 
the data subject with several methods (ema il, post, telephone calls) to receive 
communications once they have opted-in.
309
 These are guidelines suggested by the ICO,
310
 
and it is submitted that when the Information Regulator does commence enforcement of 
POPI, that it takes lead from the ICO in promulgating guidelines to ensure the effectiveness 
of the opt-in regime and its mechanics. 
5.2.4 The Direct Marketing Association (DMA) 
As with SA, the UK also has a self-regulatory DMA which was founded in 1992.
311
It aims to 
raise the standards of practice in the industry and to set codes of practice which is consistent 
with legislation. The DMA has also set up the direct marketing authority to monitor 
compliance with its codes. However, as with SA, its membership is entirely voluntarily and 
so if a particular marketer does not wish to abide by its rules, it simply will not become a 
member of the DMA. 
As will be discussed in chapter 6, the effectiveness of such self-regulatory bodies is 
questionable, as it is not a mandatory regulatory framework and therefore direct marketers 
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circumvent its rules simply by not becoming members or by resigning from the organisation 
when it suits them. 
5.3 New Zealand 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In drafting data protection legislation, the NZ law commission commented that it is not so 
much the promulgation of laws that are of paramount importance, but rather that these laws 
should be as effective as possible.
312
In contrast to this approach, SA, perhaps with good 
intent, promulgated several pieces of legislation, and this is not always to the benefit of the 
consumer as sometimes legislation conflicts with each other.
313
Furthermore, providing 




5.3.2 The common law right to privacy 
The NZ common law does not specifically cater for the right to privacy as South African 
common law does. Instead, the protection of personal information in the common law is 
protected in other torts such as breach of contract, breach of confidence, negligence, 
copyright, defamation, malicious falsehood and the tort of passing off.
315
 
5.3.3 The constitutional right to privacy 
Unlike SA, NZ does not have an explicitly codified constitution however it does have a 
constitutional document known as the Bill of Rights Act of 1990.
316
 It also does not expressly 
provide for the right to privacy but it does implicitly regulate privacy.
317
Despite the fact that 
there is a lack of explicit codification of a constitutional right to privacy, the Bill of Rights 
Act does recognise that privacy may be a justifiable limitation, which can be placed on other 
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 and this means that in so far as data privacy is concerned, data 
protection will not necessarily be overridden in the furtherance of other rights.
319
 
5.3.4 The Privacy Act of 1993 (PA) 
The PA is not a generic piece of law as it aims to regulate data privacy exclusively. As NZ is 
a member of the OECD, the purpose of the PA is to protect the right to privacy in accordance 
with the OECD Guidelines, and as a result, the PA contains similar provisions to those 
contained in POPI. 
The PA applies only to natural persons and not juristic persons, as explicitly provided for in 
the definitions of “personal information” and “individual”.
320
 The PA also provides for 12 
information privacy principles
321
 which bear immense resemblance to the pr inciples 
contained in the OECD Guidelines, save for the twelfth principle, which is not contained in 
the guidelines and which states that unique identifiers such as passport and identity numbers 
are not to be provided to agencies, unless such provision is necessary for the agency to fulfil 
its function. 
The first four principles deal with the collection of personal information, whilst principles 5 
to 8 deal with the storage of personal information, principles 9 and 10 deals with the use of 
information, and lastly principles 11 and 12 deal with the disclosure of such information. 
SA does not distinguish between different stages of processing in this way and it is submitted 
that this differentiation be improved to follow EU style legislation that encompasses all 
possible actions with regard to personal data as “processing of personal information”.
322
 Roos 
submits that this is because “in the modern online environment the distinction between 
collecting, storing, processing and transfer of data becomes blurred.” 
The PA does not provide for a distinction in the treatment of “sensitive information” such as 
information relating to race, health and political information as POPI does, and it is submitted 
that this is perhaps incongruent with other data protection regimes.
323
 This is because 
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sensitive information ought to be subject to more stringent safeguards, and cannot be treated 
in the same way as any other type of personal information.
324
 
5.3.4.1 Cross border transfers 
The PA unlike POPI, does not specifically prohibit cross-border data flows to foreign 
jurisdictions, however the Privacy Commissioner is given the power to prevent data flows in 
respect of information that has been received from another jurisdiction if the transfer of 
information is likely to be to another jurisdiction which does not have comparable safeguards 
to the PA and the transfer would likely lead to a contravention of the basic principles of 
national application set out in part two of the OECD Guidelines and Schedule 5A of the  
PA.
325
 POPI however appears to go a step further, to specifically provide that foreign 




5.3.4.2 Direct Marketing under the PA 
The PA does not specifically regulate direct marketing, however it is submitted that an 
individual may assert their rights in terms of it should a particular direct marketer invade their 




It is submitted that this is a vital flaw of the PA as the direct marketing sector is a specialised 
industry, and simply relying on generic data privacy legislation may not necessarily result in 
the adequate protection of consumers. It follows then that the regulatory framework in SA 
offers far more specialised treatment of the direct marketing industry than NZ. 
5.3.4.3 Enforcement of the PA 
The PA is enforced by the Privacy Commissioner who is seen to be its “statutory guardian”
328
 
and its primary function is to receive and resolve complaints in relation to violations of the 
PA.  
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Examples of law enforcement by the Privacy Commissioner include mediating a dispute 
between a complainant who had consented to the publishing of his email address that resulted 
in him receiving spam, and the management company to whom he had provided his details.
329
 
The Privacy Commissioner had established consent on the part of the complainant but was 
still able to mediate the situation by requesting that the management company remove the 
complainants email address from their website, which resulted in both parties being satisfied 
with the outcome. A further example relates to the incorrect disclosure of a complainant’s 
health records by the District Health Board to the complainant’s insurer.
330
 The Privacy 
Commissioner established that such disclosure was incorrectly made and ordered that 
compensation be payable to the complainant and that the staff of the District Health Board 
undergo further training in so far as disclosing and processing individuals personal 
information is concerned. 
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the Privacy Commissioners’ function is the 
power to issue codes of conduct for specific industries that materialise into law.
331
 The effect 
of issuing a code under the PA is that the particular code alters the operation of the PA for 
that specific industry and makes compliance with the code mandatory.
332
 This is an incredible 




Furthermore, the codes may be modified or repealed by the Commissioner with ease, and this 
ensures that the codes are able to stay relevant as a form of flexible regulation.
334
 The 
emphasis on the usefulness and practicality of such codes of conduct is indicative of the 
importance that the NZ system places on self-regulation as an effective method of the 
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5.3.5 The NZ Marketing Association (NZMA) 
The NZMA is a self-regulatory industry which bases itself on voluntary memberships as do 
most self-regulatory bodies.
336
It has been in existence for over 40 years, and it has a 
membership of over 6500 businesses.
337
It has developed a code of practice which regulates 
direct marketing, and which all marketers must comply with.
338
 The fact that the NZMA has 
been existence for such a long period of time, and that its membership spans to such a large 
number is indicative of the fact that NZ fosters self-regulation as a respected and useful tool 
in so far as the regulation of direct marketing is concerned.  
5.4 Commentary 
 
Although POPI has been drafted in a manner that takes due cognisance of EU data protection 
laws, which are inextricably reflected in that of the UK and NZ data protection regimes, there 
are some notable comparisons between the laws in these jurisdictions which are as follows: 
 
a) SA is described as a constitutional democracy and the right to privacy is entrenched in 
both the Bill of Rights and the common law.
339
 In contrast, the UK and NZ does not 
specifically entrench the right to privacy, and instead the right to privacy is regulated 
in various pieces of legislation. In this regard it is submitted that SA’s approach to the 
protection of privacy allows for there to be a clearer placing of the right to privacy, 
i.e. that it is a constitutional imperative, and that POPI is meant to give effect to this 
right.  
b) It can be seen that POPI has a wider application than the legislation in NZ and the UK 
as it applies to both natural and juristic persons, whereas the legislation in the latter 
two jurisdictions apply only to natural persons. It is submitted that this is perhaps 
because these laws were promulgated several years ago in comparison to POPI, and it 
was perhaps thought that direct marketing affects mostly natural persons, and so 
provision need not be made for juristic persons. In the age of modernisation, 
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establishment of small business and the advancement of technology, businesses are 
becoming more exposed to direct marketing than before, and POPI caters for this 
change in the dynamic. 
c) There appears to be some inconsistency in the way that direct marketing is regulated 
in the UK as the DPA provides for an opt-out mechanism, whereas the PEC 
regulations adopt the opt-in approach. It is submitted that the opt-in approach be used 
as a consistent standard, as done so with POPI. This will not only create legal 




d) In so far as the regulation of direct marketing in NZ is concerned, it can be seen that 
although the PA does not specifically provide for direct marketing, the power of the 
Privacy Commissioner to convert direct marketing codes of practice into law 
compensates for this lack of specification and it is submitted that the Information 
Regulator lean on the strength of the Privacy Commissioner in this regard. 
e) The ICO in the UK, as discussed, plays a considerable role in so far as enforcing the 
data protection regime in the UK is concerned. It is submitted, that when the 
Information Regulator becomes fully operational, that it should take guidance from 
the ICO in respect of developing a strict stance against violations of POPI, and also in 
terms of putting forth guidelines about how the opt-in mechanism ought to function 
and how informed consent should be obtained. 
f) Despite the DMA in NZ being a voluntary body as is the case with the UK and SA, 
the codes promulgated by the DMA in NZ, if accepted by the Privacy Commissioner, 
may very well become peremptory law even for non-members and this is a significant 
loop-hole that is avoided by NZ law, that is present in the regulatory framework in the 
UK and SA.  
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
It can be seen that each jurisdiction has its own traits, which come with both advantages and 
disadvantages. The UK’s data protection framework appears to be a system that heavily relies 
on government regulation and in as much as this creates stability, it may create rigidness in 
some instances. The legal framework in NZ can be said to be a system of regulation which 
SA can aspire to emulate in certain aspects. This is evident from the fact that NZ had 
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recognised the need for comprehensive data protection legislation over twenty years ago, 
whereas SA only recognised this need in 2013 with POPI. Furthermore, NZ strikes a healthy 
balance between self-regulation and state regulation, and this is evident from the vast 
membership of the over 40-year-old DMA. 
It is suggested that perhaps the Information Regulator could make use of its powers of 
investigation into data protection trends by investigating the laws in the UK and NZ, so as to 
take away helpful insights into the most effective ways of regulating direct marketing. A 
pertinent lesson to be learnt from NZ for example is that the Privacy Commissioner is given 
great powers to be able to convert direct marketing codes of practice into law. This is 
certainly a strength that the Information Regulator could draw on and emulate so as to create 
peremptory codes of conduct for direct marketing in SA. In relation to the UK, a vital 
characteristic that the Information Regulator could imitate is the ICO’s strict and effective 






Chapter 6: An analysis of the various forms of regulation in South Africa 
 
6.1.Introduction 
Direct marketing is largely regulated in SA by statute in the form of the CPA, ECTA and 
POPI. Despite the existence of these statutes, it is evident from the discussion in chapter 4 
that the practice still encounters abuse and as a result, it is the consumer who bears the 
inconvenience of unsolicited direct marketing. The extent to which the state is expected to go 
to protect consumers must be compared to that of having a free market system
341
 that is left to 
regulate itself entirely, with a view to find a middle ground between these polar systems of 
regulation. 
This chapter will therefore consider the three forms of regulation prevalent in SA i.e. state 
regulation, self-regulation and co-regulation,
342
 and will aim to determine which form will be 





 recognise all three systems of regulation. 
6.2.Statutory regulation 
Government regulation refers to “a rule of order having the force of law, prescribed by a 
superior or competent authority, relating to the actions of those under the authority's 
control.”
345
 This means that government promulgates legislation which then binds individuals 
and non-compliance with such legislation results in the enforcement of sanctions and 
penalties. 
The CPA has established the CC to address consumer complaints which violate the CPA and 
the NCA,
346
 however the effectiveness of the CC is a much debated topic. This is because it 
is often extremely difficult to get a hold of the CC due to a non-responsive call centre, and/or 
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 has remarked that the CC lays out 
a difficult process for consumers to follow should they seek relief. For example, if a 
consumer has purchased a defective product, they must first approach the supplier of that 
product for relief. In the event that the consumer has no success with the supplier, they must 
then approach either a relevant ombud, alternative dispute resolution forum or consumer 
court, of which there aren’t many across SA. 
If all the aforementioned remedies fail, it is only then can a consumer approach the  CC. In 
this regard, Professor Woker submits that consumers often get confused as to how to go about 
solving their problems, and those who do not, simply do not wish to put the time and effort 
into following such a long and drawn out process.
349
 
Nonetheless, despite there being weaknesses in the enforcement capacity of the CC, the 
establishment thereof was indicative that SA had realised that there was a need to cater for 
the concerns that consumers face, and it is submitted that some form of recourse is preferable 
to none at all. This is perhaps an opportunity for the Information Regulator to set a precedent 
which the CC can draw on in respect of enforcement of the CPA. 
From the discussion in chapter 4, it is evident that direct marketing is densely regulated by 
statute and it is therefore submitted that at present, it appears that although SA has the 
opportunity to indulge in some form of self-regulation or co-regulation (to be considered 
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6.2.1.  The advantages and disadvantages of statutory regulation 
The advantages of statutory regulation are as follows:
350
 
a) With regulation in place, there is the benefit of adjudication. Once decisions have 
been made by the courts, a precedent is set and this allows for other consumers to rely 
on such judgments. 
b) Legislation is drafted and passed in accordance with public policy. This means that a 
particular piece of legislation will usually be representative of what society wishes at 
a particular point in time. 
c) Legislation creates legal certainty. 
d) Legislation represents the force of law and those who do not comply will have to face 
the wrath of the law. 
e) It also prescribes minimum standards of behaviour which may not be derogated from. 
In the context of direct marketing, examples of such standards include the opt-out and 
opt-in mechanisms created by the CPA and POPI respectively. 
The disadvantages of statutory regulation are outlined by Baldwin and Cave
351
 as follows: 
a) Legislation is often inflexible, rigid and unresponsive to change. This means that it is 
more difficult to regularly amend legislation, and that legislators are unlikely to 
incorporate every single change in the industry into legislation. 
b) There is often also a long delay before the regulations take effect, and so this will 
leave the industry unregulated for a gap period. As can be seen with POPI, regulations 
have not yet been promulgated despite the activation of the provisions relating to the 
creation of regulations.  
c) Enforcement of legislation is costly and is administratively a burden as in most 
disputes, the solution is linked to litigation.
352
 With many courts, there is a back-log 
with cases and this may lead to a consumer waiting for a long period of time in order 
to seek judicial redress.
353
 
d) Many consumers require instant solutions to their issues as opposed to following 
lengthy processes of exercising their rights as pointed out above. 
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e) Compliance with legislation can also deter businesses and people from entering the 
market. This alters the chain of supply and demand and it is the consumer who then 
has limited access to goods and services.
354
 
f) It sometimes provides a minimum standard and does not require industries to go any 
further than that. Businesses therefore do not aim to comply with the spirit of the law, 
but rather just to meet minimum compliance. 
g) Part of the process of criminal sanction requires the matter to be reported to the 
police. This causes inconvenience and the situation is most likely not going to be 
given the needed attention, as the police service may not necessarily attribute the 
same amount of importance to a truant direct marketer, as they would to a serial killer 
on the loose for example. 
Although the CPA was promulgated over 7 years ago, the pre-emptive block registry has not 
yet been established, and although in light of POPI there may not be a need for it to be 
established anymore, this delay is illustrative of how legislation is not always effectively 
implemented. The regulations to POPI have also not yet been promulgated, nor is POPI fully 
effective as yet, despite it being promulgated in 2013. These are perhaps some of the major 
downfalls of statutory regulation, as in the midst of all these delays, it is the consumer who is 
left unprotected. 
Overall, statutory regulation is indeed required for the effective functioning of the direct 
marketing industry as having legal certainty and the force of law represents a stable 
regulatory framework.
355
 On its own however, it may prove to be far too rigid to provide the 
best protection for consumers. It is submitted that it be supplemented with certain attributes 
of self-regulation to be considered below, so as to create a softer middle ground for effective 
regulation. 
6.2.2.  The Information Regulator 
6.2.2.1.  Introduction 
The Information Regulator has been established by POPI
356
 and is responsible for regulating 
both POPI and the Promotion of Access to Information Act.
357
 It is an independent body, 
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which exercises its powers impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice over both the 
public and private sector.
358
 In creating the Regulator, it is clear that the drafters of POPI had 
recognised the need for a specialised body that would be responsible for the regulation of 




6.2.2.2.  Powers and functions of the Information Regulator 
Chapter 5 of POPI sets out the functions of the Information Regulator which include 
providing education in respect of compliance with POPI, dealing with complaints related to 
violations of the legislation, monitoring compliance with POPI, the creation of codes of 
conduct to regulate industries, consulting with interested parties on matters relating to data 




POPI also provides for an enforcement committee to be established, which will be 
responsible for enforcing compliance with it.
361
 Individuals are expected to address their 
complaints in writing to the Information Regulator,
362
 and such complaints may then be 
investigated accordingly.
363
 Should the outcome of the investigation yield that an individual 





The Regulator is authorised to create codes of conduct which it may do either at its own 
discretion, or if an application is made by a body that is sufficiently representative of the 
class of bodies,
365
 industry, profession, or vocation as defined in the code.
366
 This provision 
allows industries to formulate their own codes of conduct, which may then be approved and 




                                                                                                                                                                                             
357
Act 2 of 2000. 
358
s39 of POPI. 
359
M De Bruyn ‘The Protection of Personal Information Act – Impact on South Africa’ (2014) 13 (6) 
International Business and Economics Research Journal 1316. 
360
s40 of POPI. 
361
s50 of POPI. 
362




s95 of POPI. 
365
This will be decided at the discretion of the Information Regulator. 
366
s61 of POPI. 
367




One of the pertinent powers of the Regulator relates to its ability to undertake research into 
and monitor developments in matters relating to data protection, so as to ensure that any such 
development or change is continuously covered by the data protection principles in POPI.
368
 
This power is especially important, considering that technology is an aspect of life that is 
continually advancing, and it is comforting to know that the Regulator has the power to 




It is submitted that the Information Regulator take advantage of its aforementioned powers by 
researching the trends and developments of the direct marketing industry and perhaps also 
researching the successes and failures of foreign jurisdictions such as the UK and NZ so as to 
be able to issue codes that are expertly drafted on the basis of industry best practice. This will 
ensure that the framework relating to direct marketing is continually relevant and efficient. 
 
POPI also provides for the appointment of an information officer
370
 by industries and state 
bodies who will be responsible for encouraging compliance with POPI, and who will be 
expected to work closely with the Information Regulator in so far as achieving its functions is 
concerned. The appointment of the information officer is mandatory, and this is perhaps 
indicative of the strict stance that POPI aims to take in facilitating the protecting of personal 
information within businesses. In the case of direct marketers, this aims to ensure that from 
an internal level, there is no place for ignorance or circumvention of the provisions of POPI. 
 
As examined in paragraph 4.4.7, POPI’s penalty of a maximum of up to 10 years in prison 
and/or an administrative fine of up to R10 million appears to illustrate that the Information 
Regulator is meant to take a strict approach in respect of violations of the legislation. This is 
of course theoretical at this point, and it remains to be seen whether the Information 
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6.2.2.3.  Commentary  
 The success of POPI will depend greatly on the effectiveness of the Information Regulator to 
perform its functions in so far as enforcing compliance with the Act is concerned. It is hoped 
that the Regulator will take due advantage of its allocated powers and duties by for example 
conducting comprehensive research into the regulation of direct marketing both in SA and 
foreign jurisdictions to determine areas for improvement and lessons to be learnt in respect of 
data protection. Moreover, the only way to deter truant direct marketers from circumventing 
the provisions of POPI is for the Regulator to adhere to its strict sanctions and penalties, 
perhaps following the example of the ICO in this regard. 
6.3.Self-regulation 
Self-regulation refers to when industries and businesses formulate their own rules, 
regulations, codes and practices that are specific to their industry.
371
 These usually include 
setting standards for unacceptable behaviour, providing mechanisms to identify delinquent 
behaviour and formulating incentives to ensure that such behaviour is changed.
372
It also 
creates penalties for non-compliance, albeit to that particular industries approval. In order to 




Self-regulation may occur through government setting standards of regulation, and then 
regulating its compliance through industry bodies, or the bodies themselves may set standards 
and then take charge of their compliance, whilst government simply approves the set 
standards.
374
 Additionally, the bodies may either regulate the entire industry or merely 
regulate those members who have joined them voluntarily.
375
 
6.3.1.  The Direct Marketing Association of South Africa (DMASA) 
The DMASA
376
 is a self-regulatory body which has been established in accordance with the 
CPA.
377
Its membership is voluntary and it assists consumers by providing a hotline for 
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consumer complaints. Furthermore, the DMASA’s website
378
 provides a national opt-out 
register, in which consumers may indicate their preference not to be the recipients of direct 
marketing by certain businesses. The DMASA will then provide the details of the consumers 
who have opted out to its members, who are so on a voluntary basis, and the members will 
have to refrain from contacting these consumers. In the absence of the opt-out registry by the  
CC, this is the only available option to consumers at present. 
The effectiveness of this opt-out register is however questionable as previously outlined in 
paragraph 4.3.5. This is illustrative of the lack of enforcement capacity that the organisation 
possesses, simply because it is not supported by some form of state intervention.
379
 
The DMASA also comprises committees which consist of experts from various direct 
marketing industries who meet regularly to discuss pertinent developments in their particular 
line of business.
380
 It is submitted that this aspect of self-regulation is indeed a valuable one, 
as it ensures that the industry codes are continually updated and made relevant to society 
within a specific period. 
In the landmark Ketler Judgment as discussed in chapter 4,
381
 a salient triumph was made for 
self-regulatory bodies in that despite Ketler not being a member of ISPA, its code of conduct 
was still recognised as being in the public interest and was applicable to Ketler.
382
 Post the 
judgement, it is however unclear how statutory regulation and self-regulation coincides,
383
 
but nevertheless, it is submitted that this case has indeed highlighted the importance of 
industry regulation and put forth a possibility of the existence of a co-regulatory framework 
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6.3.2.  The advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation 
The advantages of self-regulation are as follows: 
a) It is cost effective and more flexible for an industry to regulate themselves.384 This is 
because there is no need to formally draft legislation, instead it is left to the industry 
to do it at their own pace and within their own cost framework. 
b) In the event of non-compliance the industry will be able to respond more efficiently 
and will not have to wait for legislative redress.
385
 
c) Rules and codes can be easily revised. 386 This is because the drafters of these codes 
are directly involved in the day to day activities within the industry and they are best 
positioned to amend or change the codes as they see fit. 
d) Use of the courts are minimised and this reduces the need for costly litigation.
387
 
e) Lastly, the very people who will be formulating the rules are most often than not 
experts in their respective fields.
388
 They are therefore better equipped to make rules 
as they are likely to have a greater appreciation for the mechanics of the direct 
marketing industry than legislators for example.
389
 
The disadvantages of self-regulation are as follows: 
a) Membership of the industry bodies are usually voluntary and this means that some 
businesses may very well be excluded from the spectrum of regulation, and so they 
will be left to operate the way they wish to, which in most cases, is in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the industry codes.
390
 
b) Industry codes can be easily changed and revised and this may sometimes lead to 
confusion and a lack of legal certainty in the consumer market.
391
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c) Enforcement of the codes depends entirely on the body’s ability to do so. 392 If it lacks 
the power and capacity to enforce its rules and sanctions, then even having the best 
codes of practice will not make a difference to the regulation of the industry. 
d) Businesses are very likely to take care of their interests over any other issues. This 
then jeopardises the objectivity of the regulations and whether or not they will be 
enforced for the true protection of consumers.
393
 
e) The regulatory bodies are usually underfunded so consumers are often unaware of 
their existence.
394
 This then hinders their enforcement capacity and consumers are 
unaware that such redress is even at their disposal. 
f) Lastly, even if the industry bodies do have sanctions in place, it is unlikely to be 
anything persuasive enough to ensure compliance and should a business not comply, 
in most cases such a business will simply resign instead of enduring the sanction.
395
 
According to Professor Woker, in order for self-regulation to be effective, two things must be 
present; namely, there must be an industry body that has the capacity to regulate the industry, 
and secondly, laid down sanctions must be severe enough to ensure compliance.
396
 She gives 
an example of the Advertising Standards Authority and comments that it is one of the most 
effective industry bodies at present due to two reasons; namely, that the chief role players in 
the industry belong to the body; and secondly that the main sanction of withholding 




Thus, it is submitted that self-regulation, entirely on its own, is unable to offer the direct 
marketing industry sufficient stability, which is needed to protect consumers. In this regard, a 
balance needs to be struck between government and industry regulation, and it is submitted 
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Co-regulation is a hybrid of self-regulation and state regulation.
398
 It compliments legislation 
and is therefore not an alternative to legislation.
399
 It recognises that industries have the 
invaluable expertise to be able to regulate themselves, but that they still need a safety net in 
the form of state oversight.
400
 





 have the authority to recognise industry codes of conduct which 
must comply with the relevant legislation, and which can become binding on the industry as a 
whole.
403
 To date, the CC has missed the opportunity to enforce the codes of conduct of the 
DMASA nationally, and it is hoped that the Information Regulator does not follow suit.  
In the event that the DMASA’s industry codes are recognised by both the CC and the 
Information Regulator or the Information Regulator creates its own industry codes , it is 
submitted that a solid framework of co-regulation will come into existence as there will still 
be government oversight in the form of POPI, but the recognised or created industry codes 
will form the basis of an industry specific approach to the regulation of direct marketing. 
In respect of the discussion of the regulatory framework in NZ in chapter 5, it is submitted 
that the Information Regulator draw on the enforcement powers of the Privacy Commissioner 
to recognise industry codes as peremptory law. In this way and for example, non-members of 
the DMASA will not be able to circumvent the industry codes, as it will apply across the 
board, regardless of membership. It is submitted that this approach is definitely capable of 
being implemented in the near future as the Ketler case
404
 has set the frontier for the 
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From the above discussion of the statutory and self-regulatory approaches to the regulation of 
the direct marketing industry in SA, it can be seen that both these forms appear to be on two 
extreme polar ends, each with its unique advantages and disadvantages. It is submitted that 
the most appropriate form of regulation lies somewhere in the middle of state intervention 
and industry specific regulation, which takes the form of co-regulation. A form that is 
equipped with having the stability, certainty and force of the law whilst simultaneously being 
flexible enough to stay relevant to evolving society and technology and which is able to 
expertly regulate the practice of direct marketing.  
 
It is submitted that the sanctions contained in POPI, coupled with the appointment of an 
information officer within each direct marketing business, and the power of the Information 
Regulator to potentially recognise or be guided by the DMASA’s codes of practice as binding 
across the board, are elements if present together, which can lead to the effective co-
regulatory approach to the direct marketing industry. This is because such a combined system 
will be representative of the stability and force of law, whilst still maintaining the flexibility 
of industry regulation and appreciating the fact that the direct marketing industry may offer 
considerable expertise in relation to how the market ought to be effectively regulated from an 
insider perspective. Thus, truant marketers will still have the wrath of the law to face and 
consumers and direct marketers will be able to partake in a market that is regulated in a 







Chapter 7: Conclusion and recommendations 
 
7.1.Overview 
The inspiration behind the examination of the issue of direct marketing in this dissertation lay 
in the fact that it is almost trite that every reader will have been exposed to direct marketing 
in some form or another and will relate to the difficulties faced by the everyday consumer in 
this regard. Direct marketing is not only bothersome when it is unsolicited, but it 
simultaneously encroaches on our constitutionally enshrined right to have our personal 
information respected, protected and kept private. 
Framing this problem lead to the consideration of the current regulatory framework , i.e. the 
common law, the Constitution, the CPA and ECTA. In respect of the common law, an 
individual has recourse in the form of the actio inuriarum, and although privacy does not 
exist as a distinct and separate right under the common law, it has been judicially interpreted 
to form part of the concept of dignitas, and has now been recognised as being an independent 
personality right.
405
 However, a fundamental flaw of the common law is that in order to have 
access to the actio inuriarum as a remedy, the actions of the direct marketer in misusing the 
personal information of a consumer, must have been intentional. Thus, negligent acts of a 
direct marketer will not be sufficient to satisfy the fault element, and the consumer would at 
this point have to rely on the Constitution and statutory remedies. 
In my view, and in comparison to the UK and NZ for example, which do not codify or 
entrench the right to privacy as SA does, the Constitution comprehensively regulates the right 
to privacy and allows for a clearer placing of the right, i.e. that it is a constitutional 
imperative.
406
 In order to give effect to the Constitution, the legislature promulgated several 
statutes, for example, the CPA and ECTA, which regulates direct marketing in sections 11 
and 45 of each piece of legislation respectively.
407
  
In terms of the aforementioned sections, the consumer is currently afforded opt-out 
mechanisms through which they may indicate their preference not to be contacted for direct 
marketing purposes. However, as examined in paragraph 4.2.5, these opt-out mechanisms are 
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riddled with difficulties and are a vital contributory factor as to why consumers face hardship 
in relation to direct marketing. 
The subsequent promulgation of POPI, as previously mentioned, is indicative that the 
legislature is aware that SA was in severe need for comprehensive data protection 
legislation.
408
 POPI is seen to be a fundamental game-changer in the industry, by rendering 
the aforementioned opt-out mechanisms superfluous and by establishing the regime of opt-in 
consent, thereby attempting to reduce the scourge of unsolicited direct marketing in SA.
409
 
In light of the aforementioned study of direct marketing, the purpose of this chapter is to 
draw a conclusion as to the effect that POPI will have on the regulatory status quo, and 
provide suggestions for the way forward in so far as improving the existing problem areas in 
the direct marketing industry. 
7.2.Recommendations for South Africa 
POPI is a significant improvement on the current opt-out system, as now direct marketers 
will not be able to inundate consumers with unsolicited communications until such 
consumers take the effort to opt-out, but instead would need to ascertain the consumers 
consent before sending through marketing communications. This change is indicative that the 
legislature wishes to tip the power-balance in favour of the consumer so that consumers are 
left feeling more empowered and more in control of their place in the market.  This proposed 
change in favour of the consumer is also in line with global trends of consumer awareness 
and empowerment which indicates that SA is or is aiming to be on par with developed 
markets in so far as consumer protection is concerned
410
. 
There are however some concerns which relate to the fact that POPI only requires a 
consumers’ consent to be obtained once. It is submitted in this regard, that if abused, the opt-
in regime could essentially revert to an opt-out system as consumers, although having 
initially consented to communications, may after a while be inundated with unwanted 
communications and would thereafter have to opt-out once again.
411
 In order to prevent this 
situation from arising, direct marketers should only be permitted to contact consumers who 
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have consented for similar communications, and if the consumer wishes to ha lt such 
communications, they should be given an effective mechanism to opt-out. 
Moreover, both the current opt-out and future opt-in regimes, should be revised so as to 
follow the example of the UK’s DPA, which specifically details how the mechanism should 
work. Such specificity lessens the scope for abuse and offers greater protection for the 
consumer. 
POPI’s opt-in regime can be said to conflict with the CPA’s provision for the establishment 
of a national pre-emptive block registry, as the mere fact that a consumer will have to give 
their consent to communications, to an extent nullifies the purpose of the registry.
412
 It is 
submitted that the legislature provide clarity on how these two provisions will co-exist, if 
they are to that is, however it is suspected that there will not be a need for the registry to be 
established anymore. Moreover, considering that the establishment of the registry was 
delayed to date, it is unlikely that the CC will comply with this aspect of the CPA in light of 
the changing landscape that POPI imposes. 
The discussions in chapters 4 and 6 have outlined that statutory regulation on its own, appears 
not to be as effective as it was perhaps intended to be. This is because legislation is often 
inflexible and rigid and not responsive to change, amongst other reasons. Industry regulation, 
as discussed in paragraph 6.3, on its own appears to lack the enforcement capacity that 
legislation offers. It is therefore submitted that a balance be struck between the statutory 
regulation of direct marketing under the CPA, ECTA and POPI and industry regulation, in 
the form of co-regulation so as to have the stability of legislation whilst simultaneously 
having the flexibility and expertise of industry regulation.
413
 It is further submitted that such a 
system of co-regulation will be able to effectively deal with the current legislative 
inconsistencies experienced by South African consumers to date. 
With regard to communications that are received from foreign jurisdictions, it is submitted 
that the legislature considers how the data protection framework in SA could extend extra-
terrestrially, to protect consumers from unsolicited communications holistically and not just 
within SA. This could perhaps take the form of a multilateral agreement between the 
countries that typically engage in sending cross-border communications and which has 
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similar data protection legislation so that such communications are captured regardless of the 
jurisdiction to which it is sent.
414
 
Lastly, it is submitted that in order to stay relevant and to ensure that legislation is always 
dealing with evolving technology, that the regulation of direct marketing in SA be regularly 
visited so that new advancements in technology do not create vacuums within which direct 
marketers may circumvent the law. In my view, it is the Information Regulator who will be 




7.3.Recommendations for direct marketers  
It is important for direct marketers to note that the dawn of POPI is not only inevitable, but 
that it is going to fundamentally alter the status quo as they know it. It is submitted that direct 
marketers engage in preparation for compliance with POPI as outlined in paragraph 4.4.8. 
Furthermore, in the event that a particular marketing company has branches in foreign 
jurisdictions, it is recommended that such companies ensure that the foreign jurisdiction 
offers adequate protection to the personal information of consumers, which is either similar, 
or superior to the protection offered in POPI. This will enable such companies to continue 
business as usual, so long as compliance with POPI is at the forefront of their business plan. 
It is also recommended that direct marketers actively involve themselves in issues concerning 
a self-regulatory approach to the industry so that in the event that the Information Regulator 
utilises its allocated powers to create binding industry codes, such marketers would have been 
engaged with such issues, and possibly would be able to contribute to the formation of such 
codes. This will ensure that the interests of all stakeholders involved are catered for as 
appropriate. 
7.4.Recommendations for consumers 
Perhaps one of the most important elements of consumer protection mechanisms is that of 
consumer education. Consumers need to be alert as to what their rights entail and what relief 
they have access to should their rights be violated. For example, consumers should be made 
aware of the dawning opt-in regime in POPI so that they know that marketers need to obtain 
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their consent first before any communications may be sent to them. As a further example, 
consumers need to be aware of when they may be contacted for direct marketing purposes so 
that they may refuse contact from direct marketers within prohibited times.
416
 These are some 
essential facts that consumers must be conscious of in order to effectively vindicate their 
rights to data privacy. 
It is submitted in this regard that the Information Regulator ought to draw on the powers 
afforded to it in terms of section 40(1)(a) of POPI, so as to promote consumer education by 
undertaking educational programmes to make consumers aware of their rights in relation to 
POPI and data privacy.  
Ultimately, it is however the consumer who must take responsibility for their data privacy 
concerns as the shift in the legislative dynamic awards more power to the consumer than 
before and accordingly, advantage should be taken of this. Consumers can empower 
themselves by: researching data protection and direct marketing trends; reporting truant direct 
marketers to the Information Regulator; contacting the Information Regulator for information 
if they are uncertain what action to take in particular circumstances or if they are unsure of 
their rights in a particular situation; and holding the Regulator accountable when they feel 




In light of all of the above recommendations, it can be seen that SA has laid a solid 
foundation for the protection of personal information and the promulgation of POPI is yet 
another way of aligning itself to international standards of data protection. It is further hoped 
that POPI does in fact meet its mandate in relation to protecting personal information as it is 
submitted that this will largely depend on the enforcement capacity of the Information 
Regulator. Thus, the success of POPI, in so far as effectively improving the regulation of 
direct marketing in SA is awaited with bated breath. 
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